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This thesis analyzes the process of IP assignment and internet policing and proves that a 
national IP address database will allow law enforcement and governmental agencies 
improvements in real-time, secure access to subscriber identifying information without 
compromising the security and privacy of internet users.  For the last three decades, the 
process of monitoring access, usage and IP address assignments has fallen on the internet 
service providers who allow access to the internet through their IP portals.  Since they held the 
door to the internet, there was reasonability in the idea that they should monitor who goes in 
and out of that door.  That concept remained stagnant because an alternative methodology did 
not exist and numerous regulations, fees, restrictions, and uses were developed over time to fit 
that model.   This thesis  details how the implementation of a centralized IP address database 
will provide a transition from the legacy ‘provider assigned and monitored’ model and offer a 
first-of-its-kind system that migrates policing functions back under the control of the policing 
authorities.  The system establishes the best segregation of expertise, allowing the providers to 
provide service, the policing authorities to provide policing, and the governmental authorities, 
who define security safeguards, to also maintain it.  Research methodologies incorporated in 
the development of this new concept include extensive interviews with law enforcement as 
well as in-depth research on internet legislative reforms, governmental systems, and security 
concerns and requirements.  This review led to a system that successfully meets the needs of 
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When IPv4 was first outlined in RFC 791 in 1981 it was the forth version of internet protocol 
and the first to be introduced for public use.  In its introduction its scope was defined as 
follows: “The internet protocol is specifically limited in scope to provide the functions necessary 
to deliver a package of bits (an internet datagram) from a source to a destination over an 
interconnected system of networks..”1 In 1981, there was no realization as to what an 
‘interconnected system of networks’ was to become over the next 30 years.  A globally 
interconnected communication, financial, social, economic network, where everything from 
video games to telephone service and vehicle navigation was intertwined in a single network, 
was unforeseen.  An address structure that could provide 4,294,967,296 unique addresses 
seemed able to accommodate interconnectivity for all perpetuity.  Teleport into the future 30 
years and we find a world where much of our existence, from our work to our home to our 
government, could not function without a world-wide network that is always on and always 
available.  Presently most technology providers are now working on a migration to the newest 
version of internet protocol, IPv6, to accommodate the exponential growth in networked 
applications and interconnected users.  This new version of IP, based on a format of 128 bits, 
extends IP addressing to 3.4×1038 unique IP addresses.  As our predecessors believed with IPv4, 
technologists once again believe this new quantity should accommodate all IP addresses 
needed for perpetuity.  Will it?  It sounds limitless until one begins to count the number of 
                                                 
1     Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California.  Internet Protocol.  Darpa Internet Program 
Protocol Specification.  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt (accessed January 2011).   
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devices that can at some point become ‘enabled’ and suddenly the number seems only 
reasonable and not limitless.   
We look at our IP processes and our evolution of networking through the same 1981 eyes.  
Many functions or processes are directed toward a network environment based on a single 
point in time and then work to keep their place intact as the technologies around them change.  
This is commonplace when looking at the historical legislation that has attempted to modify or 
direct the internet and its use.  With a legislative process mired in partisanship and lobbying, 
legislative orders can take years to implement.  Often by the time they are implemented the 
technologies they are based upon have changed.  Dictates are implemented based on a point in 
time without proper preparation of what is to come.  This holds true to the very components of 
the internet itself and the most basic connecting block to that global interface which is the IP 
address.  The national model of IP address assignment, as well as its subsequent use, storage, 
protection, and investigation, are all based on models that were developed back when IPv4 was 
going to automate the business world and long before IPv6 meant we might have enough IP 
address space to automate every single tool in our lives.  In 1981, without the vision to see 
where this new internet could go and the comprehension that this new internetworking 
platform could one day become a new criminal front, the processes for protection of a user’s 
internet security were undefined as were the methods to protect and police it. Without the 
knowledge or tools to perform these monitoring and policing functions, the tasks fell upon the 
one group that could, the service providers who were providing the IP address token that 
opened up the global internet for use.  Service providers moved from the role of providing 
internet services to their subscribers, to a role of providing internet monitoring, logging and 
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reporting to the government and law enforcement.  While subscribers were willing to pay for 
the use of the provider’s network, governmental agencies were not willing to pay for the usage 
surveillance they required of those same subscribers, leaving the cost burdens to fall upon the 
provider and ultimately back on the subscribers themselves.  The process formed as a reaction 
to changes that government and law enforcement were not prepared to address.  A world wide 
educational and business integration platform was suddenly an open access portal for 
unrestricted and anonymous criminal activity.  Stepping back and now assessing the reality that 
is the internet, and the freedoms that US citizens have grown to expect in every aspect of their 
lives, the process of providers being the entity of internet surveillance seems archaic and 
dysfunctional.  There must be a better way to bring the policing function to the agencies that 
are appropriately trained to perform it.   
 
This thesis analyzes the process of IP assignment and internet policing and proves that a 
national IP address database will allow law enforcement and governmental agencies 
improvements in real-time, secure access to subscriber identifying information not accessible 
in today’s traditional provider-only process, without compromising the security and privacy 
of internet users.  
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A Review of IP Address Management Today 
Most internet users are unaware of the systems or processes that support their access to the 
internet.  Very simply they want the internet to be available 24x7x365 and, other than the 
monthly fee to their provider, know very little about the technologies that get them there.  
Here is a recap of how the internet IP process works.   
 
Internet service providers (ISPs) purchase ranges of IP addresses from an Internet Assigned 
Number Authority (IANA).  This IANA provides the ISP with exclusive ownership/use for the IP 
address space for as long as the ISP continues renewal. ISPs then divide these IP address ranges 
into smaller allocation blocks, typically segregated by geographic regions.  Within these 
allocation blocks individual IP addresses are then leased to the ISP’s customers for a monthly 
subscription fee.  Figure 1 shows the chain of IP address allocation for providers within the 
United States.   
 
 





This subscribed IP address provides the customer with a connection method or access point to 
the Internet.  In order to adequately share the IP address resources across the ISP’s customer 
base, customers share a dynamic pool of addresses.  Upon subscribing, an IP lease is assigned 
to the customer and is given a varying lifespan for the customer dependent upon customer use.   
While a standard lease period may range from one day to several months, customer usage 
often regulates how often a subscriber’s IP address will change or how long a customer may 
retain one unique IP address.  The process works as follows: 
 
A customer purchases data services from an ISP and receives an IP address upon connecting 
through the provider’s network.  The service provider issues the customer a default lease of 
<14 days> for the IP assignment (a typical value).  If the customer does not regularly use the IP 
address (not using their computer regularly or powering down their data modem for extended 
periods of time) the IP address will be pulled back into the allocation pool to be assigned to 
another subscriber for internet use.  Should the first customer resume internet connectivity, 
the ISP would assign the customer another IP address from the pool.  This scenario outlines the 
process of ‘dynamic’ IP address allocation, allowing a range of IP addresses to be shared across 
all of the provider’s subscribers.  Without this dynamic process, IP addresses would become 
static, and once assigned would remain with a customer for perpetuity.  Static assignments 
would greatly diminish the number of IP addresses available for new subscribers, having tied up 




This assigned IP address is the Internet access point for the subscriber.  ISPs are able to link the 
IP assignment to the customer in order to track allocation of bandwidth and service usage.  This 
IP address links the customer to their internet activity and is the technical connection to ensure 
activities on the World Wide Web accurately make their way through the ISP back to the 
intended computer / user. This ability to link the customer to their specific activity on the 
internet is a technical requirement.  It is also the basis for broad concern about the privacy of a 
subscriber’s internet activity and identification relative to cyber crime.     
 
While desiring always-on connectivity, consumers have grown more cognizant of security 
liabilities inherent in the internet.  Identity theft and cyber crimes have become frequent topics 
for local and national news making it important to understand that today’s IP management 
process was developed for a reason.  Instances of internet crimes increased at staggering rates, 
with criminals operating in complete anonymity in an environment nearly free of policing.  After 
9/11, few citizens would argue that national security is not vitally important and none would be 
tolerant of a government that allowed another terrorist act upon its citizens.  The argument for 
accurate and timely internet identification information is valid when it relates to criminal or 
terrorist activity.  How can that criminal activity be separated from the millions of legitimate 
internet transactions that occur every day? 
 
For law enforcement officials, the process of locating a cyber criminal can be arduous and 
unfruitful.  Because ISP were not historically required to retain subscriber IP address data, many 
didn’t or routinely only kept data for 30 days or less.  When investigators identified criminal 
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internet activity, they were unable to determine who it originated from because ISPs either 
didn’t have it, or the process to request it took so long that data was long since purged by the 
time it was requested.  There was no legal leverage requiring the ISPs to track the data or keep 
it.  On the other side of the issue, ISPs also had a legitimate requirement to protect the privacy 
of their subscribers.  Unauthorized access to subscriber information, by linking internet usage 
to the IP address assigned to the customer, could result in hefty penalties to ISPs.  The middle 
ground came in the creation of the two-subpoena process where law enforcement and 
government agencies could legally subpoena the ISP to provide subscriber records.  The process 
is as follows: 
 
Investigators identify a screen name as the originator of a criminal activity.  The law 
enforcement unit must subpoena the provider of the screen name (say AOL) to obtain the IP 
address that the screen name is being accessed from.  The legal process of providing the 
subpoena to AOL and the subsequent processing time of the subpoena by AOL can take many 
days or weeks.  Here, the AOL email/instant message service is an application operating on top 
of the internet connection provided by the ISP.   
 
When the investigator receives the response to the subpoena from <AOL> they next have to 
research the IP address provided to determine which ISP owns that IP range.  The IP addressed 
could be owned by Verizon, Comcast, or any one of hundreds of small ISP providers around the 
country.  When the determination is made as to who’s network the activity is occurring on, law 
enforcement must then provide a second subpoena to the ISP requesting subscriber name and 
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address information.  As was the case with the first subpoena, a response can take anywhere 
from several days to many weeks.  The response time, from an investigators perspective, is too 
long to be productive or reasonable.  They can identify criminal activity but have no ability to 
locate the whereabouts or identify of the criminal long after the activity has occurred.   
 
Keep in mind that the process outlined here is the best-case scenario. Where the subpoena 
process is a legal matter, any error… typographical or otherwise… can result in the document 
being returned for correction. Any such error only adds to the delay in obtaining information.  
Many law enforcement agencies recount having to wait a year or more for information to be 
provided.   These delays only increase the likelihood that data will no longer be available, no 
longer in archive at the ISP.  Nearly half of subpoenaed information for ISP data is returned as 
‘no data on file’2.   
For the ISP it is also a matter of quantity.  In an email interview with one ISP’s Senior Director of 
Compliance and Legal Affairs, the compliance team can receive anywhere from 350 to 450 
subpoenas per month.  When those subpoenas are broken down to the individual IP addresses 
to be researched, the number grows to more than 630 subpoenaed IP address requests per 
month.  The team of five subpoena processors is responsible for documenting, researching, 
processing and responding to each of these subpoena requests.  While the average response is 
10 days, many can take much longer depending upon the date of the original activity and 
whether the data has been archived offsite.  As high as this volume may seem, this quantity 
                                                 




only reflects requests specific to IP address information (only data service activity) and is not 
inclusive of IP phone records which are handled by a third party.  Inclusion of VoIP records 
would double the volume of responses this ISP is required to handle each month.  Once 
subpoenaed, data relative to the subpoena must be retained for a period of 3 years, 
compounding data storage and privacy liabilities.  
This requirement for ISPs to retain IP information about their subscribers has led to numerous 
legislative and systematic changes both for the provider and the consumer.  There is a 
legitimate need to link consumers to their internet activity.  There is also legitimate concern 
that in doing so, private information about a consumer can be accessed.   Could there be a 
better way to allow law enforcement quick access to identify criminal activity while better 
safeguarding the privacy of customer identifiable information?   
 
IP Address Registration Database 
Conceptual Definition 
Let’s compare an IP address to a vehicle’s license plate.  While a license plate, by itself, does not 
provide the public with any details of the user / owner of the vehicle, a license plate does 
provide information when it is retrieved from a secure database managed and accessed by 
State and law enforcement agencies.  The vehicle registration database does not contain a log 
of every highway, road or bridge a driver uses, or the speed at which they drove, or the time of 
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day. Instead, the database contains a mechanism to link a license plate to an owner’s personal 
information specific to the vehicle being queried.   Any determination of infraction or restriction 
is up to law enforcement to identify and record.  The nation’s highways remain available for 
open use with the exception of having to pay for service on freeways and toll roads.  At the 
simplest level, the only information that can be determined by the license plate itself is the 
state of registration and the month and year of registration.   
Now let’s apply this to an IP address.  The IP address, by itself, does not contain or provide any 
personal information of its owner / user.  While the owning ISP can be identified, similar to the 
state of registration of a vehicle tag, personal information about a specific user is not available 
strictly by view of the IP address.  As each user is assigned an IP address, often after paying a 
toll to an ISP for use of that internet highway, that user has open and unrestricted access to all 
lanes on the internet.   While the ISPs provide the opening through the toll to use the roads, 
they do not provide monitoring services to determine who is exercising lawful or unlawful 
behavior.  That policing function is performed by governmental or law enforcement agencies 
using various tools within their arsenal.  In the same way a patrolman identifies offending 
vehicles and targets them for further identification, the same is true of users on the internet 
and their assigned IP address.  Until such time as their activity triggers further inquiry, the user 
is unhindered from using the internet and all its capabilities.  
To implement this theory of a centralized IP address database, there must be both an input of 
information from the service provider and storage, indexing, and archiving data systems at the 
state and/or federal levels.  Here is how it works: 
11 
 
Customer X purchases internet service from an ISP such as Comcast.  Comcast assigns the 
customer an IP address of 77.10.176.18.  That transaction is sent to the IP Address Repository 
(IPAR).  The data string contains such information as the IP address, date and time of 
assignment, Customer X, and an ID tag associated with the ISP.  While a typical IP reservation 
period is 14 days, with continued use and limited system maintenance the user can maintain an 
IP address for extended periods of time, sometimes up to a year or more. In the event a new IP 
address is issued, regardless of when or by what mechanism, that IP record is sent to the IPAR 
as an update record.  The update record contains Customer X, IP Address assignment, date & 
time, and ISP id tag. Over the course of use, the IPAR will be updated multiple times per 
internet subscriber.  Customer X will show multiple entries, each with an IP address and date 
and time of assignment.  IP Address information can be sorted to identify all IP assignments to 
named users, to physical location or other groupings.   
Here are several of the concepts in play in a state and federal IPAR system: 
a. Historical recording and archiving of IP address information is moved from the ISPs 
to state, federal and/or law enforcement agencies.  
b. Security management of IP information would be maintained by the same entities 
already responsible for managing highly confidential information.  Similar to the 
vehicle registration database, these entities already keep confidential information 
such as: 
a. vehicle registrations, restrictions, and fines 
12 
 
b.  social security information including social security numbers, benefits and 
litigation  
c. taxation information including compensation, employment and garnishments 
d. criminal records by jurisdiction area   
 
These are entities already well versed in the management and retention of very 
confidential information...information that is much more highly confidential than an 
IP address.  
c. Access to customer indentifying information becomes immediate. The common, 
two-subpoena process is reduced by one, if not both subpoena processes.   
d. Law enforcement would continue to be held to requirements of reasonable cause 
for information requests.   
e. Small providers, who could not afford the cost of data collection and retention, can 
support an IPAR implementation, increasing availability to subscriber information 
that was otherwise unavailable.   
f. There is no change in the existing definition for the line between reasonable search 
and concerns relative to accessing the IPAR for surveillance.  The same statutory and 




g.  Yahoo, MSN, and Google fall under separate and specific definitions for Internet 
‘applications’.  Consumers already have access to the highway before they can 
access these applications. These applications would continue to be subpoenaed for 
search or usage information, in the same way a Transit Authority can be subpoenaed 
for records on toll interchange usage.  
 
Public Confidentiality and Privacy 
There lies a dichotomy in concern relative to the internet.  Users want the unhindered freedom 
to use the global internet at their own discretion.  Users also want, ideally expect, to be 
safeguarded from attack, exploitation, surveillance and other invasions of privacy while 
exercising their internet freedoms.   With the internet being a somewhat lawless environment, 
service providers bear increasing burdens to ensure the safety of subscriber identity and 
activity.   Limited monitoring and policing, however, has allowed the internet to grow as a safe 
haven for criminal activity.  How, then, does the IP Address Repository provide improvements 
to securing confidential information and protecting the privacy of consumers?   
The IPAR would follow similar requirements as defined in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act or 
DPPA.  The DPPA was implemented in 1994 to ensure the protection of personal information 
contained within the records of the Department of Motor Vehicle.3  This Act outlined specifics 
for restricting the use of a license plate or vehicle identification number (VIN) from being used 
                                                 
3 Epic.org. “The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DDPA) and the Privacy of Your State Motor Vehicle Record.” 
Electronic Privacy Information Center.  http://epic.org/privacy/drivers/ (accessed October 11, 2010).  
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to search for the name of the vehicle owner.  In addition, this Act defined specifics for DPPA 
permissible use, outlining processes for obtaining access to records that contain personal 
information.  Law enforcement would be allowed protected ‘search accounts’ to have frequent, 
ad hoc access to information.  Other entities, unless granted specific approved access, would 
have no accessibility to the private information.   
The IPAR would have very similar guidelines and restrictions.  Unless an entity is granted 
specific ‘permissible use’ access to personally-identifiable information, the database remains 
restricted from access.  While legislation such as the Patriot Act4 lessened governmental 
restrictions on internet surveillance, law enforcement agencies are still required to obtain a 
court order before they are authorized to monitor internet activity. This means that law 
enforcement and governmental agencies would not only have to apply for access to the IPAR’s 
information, they would also have to request and obtain a court order before they could use 
the information from the IPAR for internet activity surveillance.   
Supporting an IPAR means ISPs around the country must provide up-to-date information feeds 
to the central IPAR.  Issues concerning the security of these transactions must be identified and 
addressed.  On the receiving end is an agency used to receiving and protecting very confidential 
information.  Take, for example, the Internal Revenue Service and electronic tax filings.  In 
2009, more than 95 million people filed their income tax returns electronically.5  These are 
                                                 
4 Lithwick, Dahlia and Julia Turner.  “A Guide to the Patriot Act, Part 1, Should you be Scared of the Patriot Act?” 
http://www.slate.com/id/2087984/ (accessed October 1, 2010). 
 
5 KOLD, News 13®.  “IRS E-File, Free File and other electronic options”, IRS.gov.  
http://www.kold.com/Global/story.asp?S=1072219 (accessed October 1, 2010).  
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electronic transactions that contain an individual’s social security number, date of birth, 
address, annual income, and much more.  To protect the confidentiality of the information 
contained in these transactions, secure channels must be configured to ensure the safest 
delivery of this information.  As outlined by the IRS website6, safeguards include: 
• The IRS e-file System is not done over e-mail 
• The IRS e-file System has many built-in security features 
• The IRS e-file System employs multiple firewalls 
• The IRS e-file System uses state of the art virus and worm detection 
• The IRS e-file System meets or exceeds all government security standards 
• The IRS e-file System is constantly tested for weaknesses by penetration testing 
• All Internet transmissions will use SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) encrypted security measures. 
 
If these methods provide secure channels for the delivery of extremely confidential tax 
information, these same methods can be deployed to ensure IP address transactions to the 
IPAR are also delivered safely.  ISPs who feed IP data to the IPAR would be required to transmit 
only packets that are encrypted.  On the receiving end, the IPAR would be positioned behind 
multiple firewalls that would only allow registered providers through.   
Keep in mind that data being fed to the IPAR contains far less confidential information than an 
electronic tax filing.  The IPAR transaction contains only an IP address, along with the name and 
address of the owning subscriber, and a tag to identify the submitting ISP.  In a two-part 
authentication scheme, this transaction would house only one part of the information needed 
to discern internet usage.  Usage records would still be legally protected within the ISP and/or 
within internet application hosts such as Google, AOL, and Craigslist.  Those entities would still 
                                                 
6 IRS.gov. “IRS e-file: Secure Online Tax Filing”. http://www.irs.gov/efile/article/0,,id=121477,00.html (accessed 
October 2, 2010).   
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own the protection responsibility of the usage records of their subscribers and require court 
orders in order to release the information.  
 
ISP Support 
An IPAR solution offers several advantages to service providers.  Growing data retention 
requirements mean ISPs have progressively taken on increasing burdens in keeping more and 
more data relative to their subscribers and subscriber activity.  Increasing data requirements 
means increasing back-end systems that support both the storage of the data and the indexing 
mechanisms to retrieve it.   The more data stored, and the more data written to tape and 
offsite storage, the greater the liability and risk of security breach.  In addition, subscriber 
information maintained by the ISP contains much more than the IP address.  This data contains 
all subscriber activity from usage, to payment transactions, to services including email and 
wireless accounts.   
Having the only systems that marry activity to IP address means ISPs face increasing pressures 
to become the monitoring and policing authority for the subscribers they service.  Recent 
legislation implemented in the United Kingdom, known as the Digital Economy Bill, allows 
authorities to not only require ISPs to monitor their subscribers’ activities, but also hinder 
access for users identified as engaging in criminal activity on the internet7.  With similar 
                                                 
7 Parr,Ben.  “UK Passes Controversial Digital Economy Bill”.  http://mashable.com/2010/04/07/digital-economy-
bill/ (accessed October 3, 2010). 
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legislation considerations in the United States, ISPs face ever increasing policing requirements.  
An IPAR implementation helps in the delineation between provider and policing functions.   
To support an IPAR implementation, providers must provide immediate data feeds to the 
central IP address database.  Each time a DHCP system provides an updated IP address to a 
customer, the ISP must send a copy of that IP assignment, along with the name and address it is 
assigned to, to the IPAR.  With this method, law enforcement and government agencies no 
longer need to rely on the ISP to provide IP information when policing authorities request it.  
Instead, the burden of policing activity can be left in the hands of law enforcement that are 
then enabled with immediate access to IP information as it is needed.  Responsibility for the 
policing of the internet is a definition both law enforcement and service providers agreed 
needed to be defined and the IPAR helps with that designation.  
In addition to the reduction of policing requirements for an ISP, an IPAR also helps by 
significantly reducing the labor and systems needed for IP address and subpoena management.  
The subpoena process, by itself, requires application and systems to create, index, and store 
the plethora of subpoena requests received by the services providers.  Legal respondents must 
track incoming subpoenas, recording the information provided in response, and tracking the 
processing time in order to meet legal requirements.  With an IPAR providing a reduction in 
subpoena requests to the ISPs, there is a corresponding expense reduction realized by the ISP 
which can reduce such costs from being passed on to the consumer.  
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Not all burdens are removed from an ISP however.  While subpoena processing is expected to 
decrease, new data-delivery systems will have to be implemented to provide transaction data 
to the IPAR database.   These systems would have to support real-time transmission of 
dynamically or statically assigned IP addresses, provide SSL encryption of the transmitted data, 
and support authentication mechanisms with the IPAR.  These systems would have to comply 
with 24x7x365 operations and have support staff to maintain and support them.   
For data delivery to work properly, ISPs will be required to register with the IPAR to obtain an 
ISP identification tag, or ISPID (eye-spid).  This ISPID will be appended to IP address records in 
order to identify the service provider that is providing the data.  National providers that service 
customers in multiple areas of the United States, such as Comcast, will be required to obtain an 
ISPID for each jurisdictional area, typically defined as a major metropolitan area (such as Boston 
or Los Angeles) or state (New Hampshire).  Along with an ISPID, registration to the IPAR 
provides the ISP with a secure tunnel to be used to submit data.  This secure tunnel is provided 
as a uniquely assigned IP address that is allowed through the receiving firewalls.  For incoming 
transactions, this incoming network IP address is matched to the ISPID on the record as a 
method to twice authenticate the provider and accept the record.   
Non compliance with the IPAR registration would follow similar punitive actions and fines as is 
true for non-compliance with data retention requirements.  While ISPs could be assessed a 
registration fee to obtain an ISPID, greater cost emphasis would be placed on non-compliance 
penalties to encourage proper use of the IPAR.   
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 Law Enforcement and Government Agencies 
In an interview with Detective Sergeant Lang of the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit8, I 
asked what it was that law enforcement really needed from an ISP.  He listed these items: 
• Easier access to information.  Of particular interest is access to name and service 
address for IP address holders.  While service address is critical in identifying the 
location of the activity, some ISPs provide billing addresses which do not always 
correspond to location information for the customer.  
• Real-time information.  Sergeant Lang cited a recent incident where a suicide threat 
was uncovered on a website posting.  These are situations where the information 
must be expedient and accurate to the hour.  He also cited other cases of death 
threats where similar access to emergency information was needed.  
• Historical information.  In normal investigation of computer or internet crimes, there 
is often a pattern to the activity.  Having the ability to identify a user, and then see 
the length of time they held the IP address, or where an address was before or after, 
helps in solidifying evidence.  This is generally information that is not readily 
available to them in the current subpoena process.  Subpoenas typically ask for the 
IP address for the specific event... a particular IP address at a particular date and 
time.   
                                                 
8 Lang, Glen. Phone interview with Sergeant Lang, Maine State Computer Crimes Unit.  6 October 2010.  
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• Access to information that has been otherwise unobtainable.  Certain small 
providers have been unable to keep up with the technological growth required to 
meet the subpoena requests.  These small companies “never provide a response”, 
according to Lang, leaving them no method to investigate criminal activity within 
those service areas.  Another instance involved a large company that had recently 
filed bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy rulings did not mandate the company comply with 
prior subpoena reporting requirements, thus all requests for information were being 
returned as ‘no records’.   
What recourse is there for these entities that do not comply with internet service data 
requirements?  The most common recourse for providers who do not maintain records is to 
require them to appear in court as the ‘custodians of record’.  If the records are not provided 
electronically or physically, then the provider can be summoned to court to personally appear 
to testify to the data requested.  If the records are not provided or maintained however, then 
an appearance serves little purpose other than to discomfort the ISP.  A provider, with no 
records to substantiate the evidence, bears little credence in the hearings.   
These requests from law enforcement remain consistent.  They need improved and timelier 
access to information, easier methods to identify activity related to copyright infringement and 
child endangerment, and improved support for emergency situations.   Without access to such 
information, law enforcement has no recourse but to require the providers to provide the 
missing information.  Lines relative to policing responsibilities are grayed as a result.  The IPAR 
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enables law enforcement the control to police activity and set more definitive boundaries on 
responsibilities for the policing functions, where law enforcement is the best trained to do so. 
There is an additional benefit inherent in the IPAR relative to law enforcement.  While cyber 
investigators need quick access to information, they must also continue to follow proper access 
methods to obtain it.  This IPAR format provides continued support of the process for search 
and seizure of computer equipment.  The ‘internet’ by itself cannot instigate a crime.  It is 
nothing but an access highway and it is the users of this road that are using it appropriately or 
not.   The goal for investigators is to narrow down the activity to a point where they can 
reasonably request a warrant for the retrieval of computer equipment.  Access ultimately to the 
computer where the crimes occurred it key.  The perpetrator’s computer can, by itself, be 
deemed as contraband.  By definition, contraband is any property that it is illegal to produce or 
possess9. When that computer contains child pornography which is illegal to own, the computer 
is now deemed contraband and meets the criteria as illegal to possess.  The computer can also 
be the ‘instrument’ of a crime. If the computer was used in the creation of illegal pornography, 
or used to download copyrighted material, or used to hack into a database, it is now actual tool 
or ‘weapon’ used to commit a crime.  In an online criminal investigation this is the true end 
target to conclude the investigation. Obtaining access to that final computer, however, falls 
under very specific guidelines for search and seizure. 
When online activity is identified, law enforcement today has to subpoena the ISP to identify 
the owner of the IP address in question.  In an IPAR concept, law enforcement can obtain that 
                                                 
9 Contraband. Legal definition of Contraband by the Free Online Dictionary.  http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/contraband.  (accessed November 2, 2010).  
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information from the IPAR database removing the lengthy subpoena process.  This IPAR data is 
important for other reasons far beyond expedited access.  IPAR allows greater compliance 
acceptability and a more consistent format to the investigative data that will eventually be 
provided in the criminal proceedings.  Depending upon the ISP and their system capabilities, 
respondent data can come in a variety of forms.  Less sophisticated providers have fewer data 
reporting options and may be able to provide little supporting evidence other than their 
statement.  Subpoena responses can vary significantly between providers.  IPAR helps to 
eliminate inconsistencies as the data returned in a query is identical from one investigation to 
another.   
Similar to records obtained from the Department of Motor Vehicles database, consistency in 
form and content is valuable in provided improved credibility to the records.  Obtaining data 
from a secure, registered entity like the IPAR reduces the likelihood that IP address evidence 
would be inadmissible.  It provides a method to standardize the evidence record going forward.  
This is important when criminal investigations reach the critical juncture of search and seizure.  
According to Sgt. Lang, the end computer can be the most critical piece of evidence tying 
together the records from the ISP and records from their investigation.  The process to seize the 
equipment, however, can be more difficult than the original subpoena for information.  The key 
difference is that seizure requires a warrant and warrants differ greatly from subpoenas.  In the 
subpoena process agencies are asking to be provided information.  In a warrant, agencies are 
asking for permission to go get it.  It is the difference between ‘please send it to me’ and ‘I’m 
coming to take it’.  This makes the legal process of search and seizure more stringent and 
therefore the IPAR more helpful.   
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Obtaining a search warrant requires a judge or magistrate to provide a written order to search 
and obtain physical property or assets.  These are only granted in criminal investigations and 
require investigators prove probable cause that there is substantiated evidence enough to 
approve the search.  Proving probable cause requires submission of a formal affidavit along 
with the evidence gathered during the investigation.  Evidence can vary from case to case even 
when the cases themselves are very similar.  Submissions of report data from the IPAR allow a 
single format and consistent method to tie users to IP addresses when obtaining warrants.  Any 
synergy can improve the success of determining probable cause.  IPAR data is coming from a 
state secured entity, very similar to motor vehicle records submitted in criminal hearings, giving 
it the proper credence to validate the warrant request.  In a fully functional IPAR 
implementation this extract can become the standard for IP address identity evidence.   
Beyond the requirements of individual law enforcement requests are several federal 
requirements relative to law enforcement, lawful intercept of data, and CALEA compliance.  
CALEA, which stands for the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, is a law 
enacted in the United States in 1994 .. “To amend title 18, United States Code, to make clear a 
telecommunications carrier's duty to cooperate in the interception of communications for Law 
Enforcement purposes, and for other purposes.”10 Often called the ‘wiretapping law’, CALEA 
brought about several important compliance rules relative to ISPs and accessibility to data.  
Keeping in mind that wiretapping in 1994 was primary comprised of tapping into copper lines 
and interception of traditional voice traffic, very quickly this requirement transitioned into 
interception of VoIP and data packets on mostly IP networks.  Beyond the needs to produce 
                                                 
10 CALEA – Definition.  wordIQ.com. http://wordiq.com/definition/CALEA (accessed November 3, 2010). 
24 
 
records in response to legal requests, CALEA brought about a new requirement for ISPs to 
enable interception of real time call or data exchanges.   
While CALEA attempted to provide law enforcement with improved access to real-time call 
detail data, it was very slow to implement.  Carriers networks in the mid-90’s were fairly open 
to interception by their very architecture making carriers slow to accommodate structural 
changes relative to compliance on this new initiative.  By 2004, the United States Department 
of Justice filed a petition to expedite compliance requirements of the carriers to give them a 
deadline to meet the requirements of the original law.  At that time most carriers were 
transitioning to VoIP architectures bringing new sets of challenges for law enforcement relative 
to interception of data, and forcing heightened demands for compliance with the new law.  In 
response, CALEA laws were updated in 2006 to mandate a compliance deadline of May 14, 
2007 for carriers and ISPs.11  This adopted “Second Report and Order” of 2006 also defined the 
responsibility of development and implementation costs as being solely on the carriers and 
ISPs.  While the financial responsibilities were now defined as a cost for the providers, the new 
Order also went on to allow carriers the use of third parties providers to assist in meeting the 
deadline and reporting requirements.   Most importantly, this new revision of CALEA defined 
broadband and VoIP providers as “telecommunication carriers” making the final designation 
that new broadband providers and traditional telephony carriers were now combined under 
the same classification relative to data intercept and collection.   
                                                 
11   FCC 06-56. Federal Communication Commission. “Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and 
Order”, May 3, 2006.  http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-56A1.pdf (accessed November 
7, 2010).  
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Compliance with this new CALEA requirement involved many technological changes to service 
providers.  The concept of ‘intercept’ meant carriers had to provide a method for law 
enforcement to intercept subscriber’s real-time communication.  This was achieved by either 
installing intercept hardware that would allow agencies to tap into communication whenever 
needed, or installing forwarding devices that automatically transmitted intercepted data to law 
enforcement while simultaneously forwarding that traffic along to the intended party.  Neither 
of these endeavors was easy or inexpensive.  While ISPs complained about uncompensated 
costs, new third-party providers arose whose purpose was to manage CALEA compliance and 
intercept processes for the ISPs.  Interception and legal compliance, both from a hardware and 
a reporting perspective, could now be outsourced.   
The premise of intercept and outsourcing also plays a role with the implementation of the IPAR.  
Legal compliance for intercept had a deadline of May of 2007, which means a majority of 
providers now have some method to provide intercept data to law enforcement.  This concept 
of intercept works hand in hand with IP data routing to the IPAR.  The process of forwarding 
intercept data to law enforcement is very similar to the process of forwarding IP address 
assignments to the IPAR.   The IPAR adds a unique verification point between the intercepted 
real-time communication and the confirmation of the identity of the subscribers that initiate 
that communication.  Real-time data in the IPAR provides a legal method to substantiate the 
intercept data being forwarded to law enforcement.  With the right systems in place, 
government agencies could integrate the data from the two systems into one comprehensive 
and inclusive record of data identity and activity.   
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New third-party providers that offer CALEA compliance services can also integrate well with the 
IPAR.  Since the introduction of intercept in 2004, several providers of compliance services have 
emerged with some offering hardware intercept services and others providing a full sweep of 
legal compliance processes and services.  One such provider, Neustar®, touts the following: “Our 
expert systems account for and track jurisdictional distinctions and nuances of all 50 states and 
all federal agencies and courts – uniformly applying them to each demand for customer 
records.”12  In addition they offer: 
• A defined strategy and turn-key solution for end-to-end CALEA compliance for voice, 
VoIP and broadband internet service. 
• A primary interface to the LEAs (law enforcement agencies) and prosecutors when a 
challenge to an order’s validity is required, or if a clarification of scope and 
reasonableness is necessary.  
While Neustar is not unique in these offerings, of importance here are the specifics to 
broadband providers and the existing interface to law enforcement.  For the ISP, if third parties 
such as Neustar now have the ability to intercept traffic, they also have the ability to integrate 
with the ISP for purposes of collecting and forwarding data to the IPAR.  This is a critical offering 
for providers who can’t meet the requirements for providing data to the IPAR whether due to 
cost or technical challenges.  Having to be compliant with intercept requirements means 
providers had to be ready for integration methods such as those offered by a company like 
Neustar.  These services can be utilized for the ISP beyond the intercept requirement and 
                                                 
12  Neurstar.com. “When law enforcement calls, will you be ready?”  http://www.neustar.biz/services/legal-
compliance-services/court-ordered-records-production (accessed December 28, 2010). 
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provide an alternate method of getting data transferred to the IPAR.  As stated above, Neustar 
also purports to understand the ‘jurisdictional nuances’ of all 50 states.  This aligns well with 
the state-based format of the IPAR and dissecting the data into the proper jurisdictional units.  
For smaller ISPs, third party providers can be the key in completing integration with the IPAR.   
Additionally, having functionality through third party vendors means companies like Neustar 
can offer an additional service.   While Neustar is being used as the mediator for the intercept 
process with law enforcement, they can also extract IP address information, integrating the two 
processes into one.  The benefits here are two fold.  For the ISP, the IPAR process can be 
outsourced to a provider that has already met the authorization guidelines for collecting and 
processing sensitive legal information.  Outsourcing could be more cost effective for the ISP, in 
particular if they are already using an outside source for intercept functionality.   Beyond the 
ISP benefits, there could be a significant opportunity in having the two processes married 
within the same third party outsourcer.  Having the existing functionality to intercept and 
collect real-time communication means providers like Neustar also have the ability to link that 
data to the IPAR, forming one complete record of activity and IP address assignment.  While 
integrating this data isn’t necessarily of interest to the provider themselves, it is critical 
information for the government agencies at the receiving end of the intercept data.  These third 
parties could provide an interim database service, which sits between the IPAR and the 
intercept systems, providing a very unique and all-inclusive service for law enforcement.   
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Lastly, beyond the opportunity for data integration, most of these third parties additionally 
offer subpoena and legal compliance services.   This could make them a possible one-stop-shop 
for ISPs as coverage for all law enforcement compliance initiatives.  Services include: 
• Court ordered records production 
• Legal and / or customer notifications 
• Records retention 
• Legal process wording 
While fulfilling the obligations of providing timely IP data to the IPAR, third party providers 
could complete the entire outside intercept and legal document processing functionality, 
offering a critical service of integrated data for law enforcement and reducing the burden on 
the ISPs.   
 
Legislative Reforms 
While law enforcement embraced rules such as CALEA, privacy advocates complained about the 
open ability for the government to tap-at-will.  Adding the growing concerns of internet 
security, legislatures have worked for more than a decade, to define rules to regulate the use 
and activity of the open and unrestricted internet.  Without having any control on the physical 
or network layers that comprise the internet, law makers were left with limited alternatives 
other than to require service and application providers to be the mechanism for obtaining 
29 
 
information.  How does an IPAR concept impact both present and future legislation relative to 
IP address information, internet activity, and subscriber protection?  Let’s review some current 
legislation and the impact to them in an IPAR implementation.  
Laws established in Nevada and Minnesota require Internet Service Providers to keep 
information regarding their customers private, unless a customer specifically approves their 
information can be given out13.  In a retail environment, stores can link your transactions 
through various databases and record your name, purchase trends, credit status, even the 
shelves you are more likely to purchase from. This law was intended to prevent ISPs from 
participating in this collaboration of subscriber purchases, in particular where a majority of 
commerce was shifting to online transactions.  Whenever a consumer visits a website, makes a 
purchase or searches for information, that activity can be linked to the specific person.  ISPs 
have far greater access to this information because the information is traveling across their 
network and comes from customers who are granted access through their IP subscriptions.   
These laws do not change with the IPAR.  ISPs must continue to protect the confidentiality of 
their subscribers’ activity.  Instead the IPAR redirects activity monitoring back to the policing 
agencies further supporting this law for privacy protection. 
In similar rulings, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion on the privacy rights of 
computer users, that computer users have a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the 
personal information they give to their ISPs. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that ISP 
                                                 
13 Blanke, Jordan M.  “Minnesota passes the nation’s first Internet privacy law”.  Rutgers Computer & Technology 




subscriber records can only be disclosed to law enforcement upon the issuance of a 
subpoena14.  While the IPAR reduces the need for the subpoena to the ISP, law enforcement 
would not be able to obtain personally identifiable information unless first being granted 
permissible use to the repository.   This protection of personal information can continue to be 
supported under an IPAR design as the user’s personally-identifiable information remains 
secured and only the database that houses the information is changed.   
In a similar manner, Minnesota also prohibits Internet service providers from disclosing 
personally identifiable information.  The Minnesota laws include a consumer's physical or 
electronic address, telephone number, Internet or online sites visited, or any of the contents of 
a consumer's data storage devices15.  They offer provisions under certain circumstances where 
information must be disclosed, such as to a grand jury, to a state or federal law enforcement 
officer acting as authorized by law, or pursuant to a court order or court action. This is 
legislation that can be fully supported under an IPAR implementation.  The IPAR helps define 
the segregation of duties between the provider of the service and the keepers of record.  
Pursuant to investigation and judicial request, the IPAR provides authorities with access to tie 
an IP address to a user, while policing agencies link internet use to criminal activity.   
                                                 
14 O’Connell, Kelly.  “Internet Law – NJ Supreme Court Says Subpoena Needed for Internet Records.” Internet 
Business Law Services.  http://www.ibls.com/internet_law_news_portal_view.aspx?s=latestnews&id=2043 
(accessed September 26, 2010).  
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As outlined in previous pages, the parliament of the United Kingdom passed the Digital 
Economy Bill16 earlier this year.  Here is a law that is controversial because it is among the first 
to dictate that monitoring of subscriber activity as a task for the ISPs.  Not only were ISPs 
required to monitor their subscribers’ activities but they were also required to prevent access 
for users identified as engaging in criminal activity on the internet.  For the first time, service 
providers are mandated as having both the policing and punitive roles.  The ruling is mired with 
a lack of definition.  How does the service provider differentiate between appropriate versus 
inappropriate activity?  If certain sites are always ‘inappropriate’, wouldn’t it be easier for the 
ISP to simply block them and prevent the monitoring, logging and reporting that would come 
along with them?  The implications for both ISPs and subscribers are concerning.   
The IPAR eliminates the need for such legislation for service providers in the United States.   
Law enforcement agencies with the training and skills needed for policing are empowered to 
police by being granted access to IP information when it is determined to be needed.  Instead 
of logging millions of transaction records for all subscribers’ activities in the event one engages 
in criminal activity, the criminal activity is identified first, then the subscriber that is engaging in 
that activity is identified and monitored.  It is a more efficient use of systems and provides the 
delineation between the highway and the traffic cops.   
Other legislative reforms have touched areas such as record retention, censorship, and 1st 
Amendment rights such as the freedom of speech.  In 1996 the Electronic Communication 
Transactional Records Act was passed by Congress.  While this Act covered the right of the 
                                                 
16 Parr, Ben.  “UK Passes Controversial Digital Economy Bill.”  http://mashable.com/2010/04/07/digital-economy-
bill/.  (accessed October 3, 2010).  
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Federal Government (or governmental entity as described in the ECTRA) to request the 
contents of electronic or wired communication from ISPs, it also established guidelines for the 
length of time requested records would be retained17.  Typically that retention period is defined 
as 90 days for any records requested via subpoena or court order from a service provider.  If a 
legal entity requests data via court order, not only is the ISP required to respond to the request, 
the response and accompanying data must be preserved for a period of 90 days after the 
request is fulfilled.  This is different than the historical two year retention of subscriber data.  
The two year record retention period means a legal entity can make reasonable assumptions 
that a subscriber’s information will be available for the previous 24-month period.  This 
directive means a request of subscriber information dated 12/25/10 should produce records on 
this customer that go back to 12/25/08.  While the 90-day retention period would continue 
unaltered with the IPAR, the two year retention period would no longer be needed.    
Even with the IPAR, the preservation order relative to subscriber data or subscriber activity 
remains as a mandated area of compliance when records are subpoenaed.  Legal proceedings 
can take many months or even years to conclude thus there cannot be a risk of loss of data for 
anything requested in a legal case.  Regardless of the existence of the IPAR, the 90 day 
retention period must be upheld.  The IPAR, however, does negate the need to keep two years 
worth of subscriber IP data.  This would now be redundant data to what exists within the IPAR.  
The implications from a legislative perspective would alter portions of the Electronic 
Transactional Records Act.  One specific example for data retention guidelines states: “Data 
                                                 
17 US Department of Justice. 18 U.S.C. 2703. Requirements for Governmental Access. 
http://justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usc2703.htm (accessed September 30, 2010). 
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should be retained in such a way as to avoid their being retained more than once...18”   This 
emphasizes the redundancy of the data now being maintained in the IPAR and support for the 
retention requirements to move to an IPAR-only requirement.   
Other legislative guidelines are less defined.  Several reforms, such as the Electronic 
Communication Privacy Act (ECPA)19 and the United States Cable Act (CA)20 try to incorporate 
rules for notification when subscriber identifiable information is provided to law enforcement 
agencies.  The establishment of the IPAR would drastically alter this principle and force changes 
to these notification provisions.  With the Cable Act established in 1984 as a method to regulate 
cable services, it was not prepared for the transition that occurred when cable providers 
transitioned to providing internet services over their hybrid coaxial fiber networks.  As such, 
under the Cable Act, there are definitions outlined when breaches occur relative to customer 
information, however there are not specific provisions relative to internet services or customer 
specific information in relation to internet usage through the cable provider. There is, however, 
guidance dictated under the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, which is more specifically 
directed to any provider who ‘sends or receives electronic communication’21.  Considering that 
this Act was established in 1986, the definition of ‘electronic communication’ during the last 25 
                                                 
18 DCS.com. “Scope and impact of the European Data Retention Directive.” 16 January 2007.  
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Directive. (accessed September 29, 2010). 
 
19 US Department of Justice. “Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.”  Justice Information Sharing. 
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20 Epic.org. “Cable TV Privacy Act of 1984.” Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
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years has changed drastically.  While district courts are still divided on whether these acts still 
meet the needs of the present technology, they differ in what is defined for notification 
processes relative to customer private information.  The CA defines notification requirements 
whenever information is provided to law enforcement.  The other, the ECPA, defines that 
notification is not required and providers are exempt from liability.  Which one then applies to 
present day service providers and would either apply to the IPAR?   
Looking at a recent copy of Comcast Corporation’s Customer Privacy Notice, the policy makes 
specific reference to the Cable Act as follows:  “As a subscriber to cable service or other services 
provided by Comcast, you are entitled under Section 631 of the federal Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, as amended, (the “Cable Act”) to know the following22:  
• the limitations imposed by the Cable Act upon cable operators in the collection and 
disclosure of personally identifiable information about subscribers;  
• the nature of personally identifiable information we collect;  
• the nature of the use of personally identifiable information;  
• under what conditions and circumstances we may disclose personally identifiable 
information and to whom;  
• the period during which we maintain personally identifiable information;  
• the times and place at which you may have access to your personally identifiable 
information; and  
• your rights under the Cable Act concerning personally identifiable information and its 
collection and disclosure. 
                                                 
22 Cox Communication, Inc. “Cox Communication LEA Information Policy”, last modified October 1, 2009. Notice to 




Comcast’s privacy notice goes on to reference the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 
includes the following verbiage:   
“In addition, Section 702 of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended, (the 
“Telecommunications Act”) provides additional privacy protections for certain information 
related to our phone services: 
• information about the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and 
amount of your use of the phone services; and  
• information contained on your telephone bill concerning the phone services you receive. 
That phone information, when matched to your name, address, and telephone number is known 
as customer proprietary network information or CPNI for short.  This notice, which includes our 
CPNI Policy, describes what CPNI information we obtain, how we protect it, and how it may be 
used.  If you are a customer of our phone services, you have the right, and Comcast has a duty, 
under the Telecommunications Act, to protect the confidentiality of CPNI.23  
 
A full copy of Comcast Corporation’s Privacy Notice is included in Addendum B.  
While there are multiple legislative references in this privacy policy example from Comcast, the 
primary reference point for the treatment of confidential data in this document is the Cable 
Act.  A fully functioning IPAR now implies changes not only to the definitions within these 
defined rulings, but also in numerous privacy policy statements that make reference to their 
compliance with these notification policies.   
For customer notification principles in relation to the IPAR, the most applicable approach is for 
customers to be made aware that the IPAR exists.  While information about a customer’s 
internet usage is not disclosed, their IP information is being sent to database that law 
enforcement can access at any time.  Again using the motor vehicle analogy, citizens are aware 
                                                 
23 Cox Communication, Inc. “Cox Communication LEA Information Policy”, last modified October 1, 2009. Notice to 





that their license and vehicle information is contained in the DMV database and is available for 
law enforcement to access at any time.  The principle with the IPAR would be no different.  
Consumers are made aware of the existence of this new application and that the scope of 
access is restricted only to approved law enforcement and governmental agencies.   Wording 
within legislative texts would have to be modified to outline specifications for conformity with 
the IPAR and this new compliance requirement for service providers.  Modifications to 
individual privacy policies would then outline the ISPs mandate for submission to the IPAR, the 
ISPs ongoing protection of the confidentiality of consumer information, and specifications of 
IPAR restrictions for use to law enforcement.   
Following typical guidelines for privacy policies, here are some expected changes that would be 
relevant to each section of a privacy policy once the IPAR is implemented: 
• Describe what information is being collected online.   Under this heading there would be 
a change to specify the collection of IP address information.  The Comcast example 
outlines the collection of name, service/billing address, e-mail address, telephone 
number, driver’s license number, social security number, bank account number, credit 
card number, and ‘other similar account information’. IP Address should be listed as 
specific collected data.  While it could be assumed to be included under the ‘other 
similar account information’ heading, it would be more appropriate to list it individually 
given the nature of IP address confidentiality concerns.   
• Describe how collected information is shared.  Here changes would outline how IP data 
is fed to the IPAR and the regulatory requirements to do so. Data is shared 
automatically, at the time the IP address is assigned, and shared to a secure federal and 
/ or state mandated repository for law enforcement and governmental purposes.  
• Describe choices available to consumers regarding marketing use of this collected 
information.   There should be no marketing use for a consumer’s IP address thus this 
should be specifically outlined.  While other information such as name, address, and 
phone number may be provided for marketing purposes, and is specifically defined in 
this section, IP address information would not be included in that distribution.  This 
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would follow similar treatment for non disclosure of customer social security number 
information for marketing purposes.  As for choices to consumers, there is no option to 
‘opt out’ of submission to the IPAR so specifics on opt-out options would have to 
delineate the exception for IPAR submission.    
• Describe the consumer’s right of inquiry about their own information.  Typically 
consumers can request copies of their own information from service providers including 
copies specific to the individual privacy policy.  This would be true of the IPAR as well.  
Consumers would have the ability to request their own records from the IPAR, in the 
same way consumers can request copies of their driving records from the Department 
of Motor Vehicle.  Verbiage specific to this option for consumers should be outlined in 
this section of the privacy policy including links for the consumer to request such IPAR 
data.   
• Describe how personal information is protected online.  This section remains consistent 
with existing privacy statements and should not require modifications to accommodate 
the IPAR.   
 
The changes documented here help to outline how far reaching the IPAR would be relative to 
existing legislative policies and company guidelines on compliance with these policies.  Another 
example is the Customer Proprietary Network Information or CPNI as referenced in the above 
Comcast privacy notice.  CPNI requirements were implemented as part of the 1996 US 
Telecommunications Act24.  Modifications to this act gave the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) the sole authority for determining how to regulate the use of information 
collected about a consumer’s telephone calls.  While this new consumer protection order was 
intended to cover items that are commonly found on any telephone bill such as the time, date, 
destination and duration of every call, it targets specific use of this collected data by telephone 
providers and how or if it can be shared.  Similar to the Cable Act, this legislation was originally 
                                                 
24 Federal Communications Commission. “Telecommunications Act of 1996.” http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html 
(accessed October 4, 2010).  
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targeted at telephone carriers who were, at that time, providing primarily copper-based, 
hardwired telephone services.  As a majority of the carriers migrated to IP-based networks and 
services, certain portions of this CPNI definition remained stagnant and required modification.  
A common argument on the VoIP architecture refers to the IP address and corresponding mac 
address that are both part of the initiation session for a call.  As such, do IP and mac address 
information fall under CPNI protection guidelines specific to telephone communication?  If so, 
how does the existence of the IPAR modify the text of the existing rules? 
The privacy policy of RidgeviewTel LLC provides a good outline of how CPNI and IP address data 
can be combined into one consolidated form.  Their policy states: “Every computer connected 
to the Internet is assigned a unique number known as an Internet protocol (IP) address. Since 
these numbers are usually assigned in location-based blocks, an IP address can often be used to 
identify the area from which a computer is connecting to the Internet. This information can be 
used by governmental authorities or RidgeviewTel for legal purposes such as tracing criminal 
acts and responding to emergencies.”25  A policy such as this does provide disclosure to the 
consumer as to how IP address information can be used.  While the IP address is not defined 
specifically under CPNI rules, it does fall under CPNI guidelines when it is married to customer 
identifiable information, and this is exactly what the IPAR does.  As such, this would indicate 
that the IPAR should fall under those same legal requirements.  It opens an interesting prospect 
of the government having to regulate itself if they are the ones that ultimately own the IPAR 
data. 
                                                 
25 RidgeviewTel™ LLC. “Privacy Policy”. http://www.myridgeviewtel.com/site-policy.php (accessed December 27, 
2010).   
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Migration to IPv6 
A majority of the addressing process in use today, and outlined here, is specific to the current 
world-wide implementation of IPv4.  As the ‘v4’ indicates, our present IP standard is based on 
the fourth version of IP deployment.  This standard, as outlined in RFC791, was defined in 1981 
and is based upon a 32 bit address, made up of four 8-bit octets.26  The four octets are used 
together to define IP address classes, and further determine bit allocations for network and 
node designators within the 32 bits.  Using this combination of network and host bits, IPv4’s 32 
bit address can support more than 4 billion unique, usable IP addresses.  While this seems like a 
sufficiently large number, when dissected across the global internet it is not nearly enough to 
support all users or systems.  Considering the top 5 countries with the highest number of 
internet users, as shown in the table below, this range of addressing in IPv4 is shown to have 
already been exceeded in just China alone:  
 
TOP 5 COUNTRIES WITH HIGHEST NUMBER OF INTERNET USERS 
 
  
Population,  Internet Users % Population Growth % of World 
Ranking Country 2010 Est Latest Data (Penetration) 2000-2010 Users 
1 China        1,330,141,295          420,000,000  0.32 17.67 0.21 
2 United States           310,232,863               239,893,600  0.77 1.52 0.12 
3 Japan           126,804,433                 99,143,700  0.78 1.11 0.05 
4 India        1,173,108,018                 81,000,000  0.07 15.20 0.04 
5 Brazil           201,103,330                 75,943,600  0.38 14.19 0.04 
TOP 5 Countries        3,141,389,939               915,980,900  
   NOTES: World Internet User Statistics were updated for June 30, 2010. The most recent user information comes 
from data published by Nielsen Online, International Telecommunications Union, Official country reports, and 
other trustworthy research sources. Data from this site may be cited, giving due credit and establishing an active 
link back to Internet World Stats. Copyright © 2000 - 2010, Miniwatts Marketing Group. All rights reserved.27 
 
                                                 
26 Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California.  Internet Protocol.  Darpa Internet Program 
Protocol Specification.  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt (accessed January 2011).   
 
27 World Internet Usage Statistics News and World Population Stats. “Internet Usage Statistics, The Internet Big 
Picture.”  http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (accessed October 11, 2010).   
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This means the migration to the next version of IP addressing, IPv6, is inevitable, and in 
actuality fast approaching.  What does this upcoming transition to IPv6 mean to an IPAR 
implementation and does this migration have positive or negative impacts to its deployment?  
Let’s start by looking at the inherent differences between IPv4 and IPv6.  
IPv6 extends the IP address from 32 bits in IPv4 to 128 bits.   This means if IPv6 was fully 
deployed across the entirety of Internet / network space, it would support 3.4x1038 usable IP 
addresses, or 3.40 undecillion (36 zeros) addresses.  While this exponentially expands the 
distribution of IP addresses available for use, it also changes the format of IP addresses.  IPv4 
addresses are configured in the 32 bit, dotted decimal notation we are now familiar with:  
192.168.2.10 which translates at the bit level to 11000000.10101000.00000010.00001010.  IPv6 
uses a completely different format for the IP address, breaking the address into eight 4-digit 
hexadecimal octets, separated by colons (xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx).   Because the 
address is hexadecimal as opposed to binary, the x values in the address can range from 0’s to 
f’s (0000 – ffff) or up to 16 different values per x placeholder.  Comparing an IPv4 address to its 
new IPv6 format we see: 
IPv4:   192.168.2.10 
IPv6:  2002:C0A8:20A:0:0:0:0:0  





So what does this mean to the IPAR?   Foremost, it means the IPAR must be able to support 
both the syntax of the IPv4 address as well as the IPv6 address format simultaneously.  The 
transition to IPv6 can be time-consuming, having to configure all devices to the new protocol, 
and does not come without upgrade costs as older devices and software may required 
upgrading to support IPv6.   As such, the transition to IPv6 will not be a quick one, but will 
instead be a migration that occurs over a considerable period of time.  This means the systems 
to support the IPAR must also be fully IPv6 compatible and also able to support incoming data 
that is either IPv4 or IPv6 based.   
The impending transition to IPv6 means the IPAR must also be sized to accommodate the 
growing number of IP-based users expected in the next 10 years.  Considering only subscribers 
in the United States, the previous table shows nearly 240 million internet users as of June 2010.  
At the date of inception of the IPAR, it would need to be sized to support at least half of those 
records.  This number is based on the point in time that the database is live to the time it takes 
for providers to modify their systems to direct IP changes to it, as well as the number of 
changes to subscriber’s information that will occur from that point in time forward.   Next, 
assuming these users changed their IP addresses only one time in the first year, the IPAR would 
have to support a possibility of 200 million records in short order.  Given that the true number 
of IP address changes per subscriber is much higher than one per annum... having to account 
for new users, moves, service changes, periods of inactivity, and system upgrades... the sizing of 
the IPAR is significant.   The transition to IPv6 itself will generate significant numbers of address 
changes for subscribers which would need to be reflected within the sizing of the IPAR.   
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Wireless Migration to 4G 
Looking forward only 10 years, we need to consider the changes to the wireless industry that 
are making it the new industry standard for ‘any service anywhere’.  The growth of wireless 
mobile devices continues to grow exponentially as users transition away from hardwired 
systems to go-with-you applications.  Service providers are merging IP into telephony, video 
and other applications.  Start a movie at home, and watch it on your cell phone as you leave 
home.  Surf the internet on your TV. Integrate your VoIP home phone to your cell phone, to 
your computer, to your TV.  This isn’t a world of tomorrow; it is the reality of today.  What it 
means at the technical level is that more and more applications are moving to IP space and 
mobile providers are transitioning to all-IP deployments.   
The current platform for wireless service is based upon 3G technology, or the third generation 
of mobile environment.   3G was originally based upon the telecommunication industry, most 
specifically the traditional telephony carriers, and their existing circuit switched cellular 
networks.  While good for providing for its generation of mobility, it was based on an older and 
slower technology.  The newer, fourth generation network or 4G, is based on a packet switched 
network which offers higher speeds and greater integration of services and applications.  
Packet switched networks are IP based, using source and destination addresses in small sized 
packets to route data across networks from one node to another.   Implementing this into the 
wireless space means a greater integration of applications to mobile devices and exponentially 
expanded use of IP addressing in the wireless world.  The impending migration to 4G means the 
ultimate transition to an all-IP based wireless environment.   
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Why is the migration to all-IP important in the wireless space and how is this relevant to the 
IPAR?  Consider the number of IP addresses in use in the typical home environment. A 
subscriber receives a modem from their provider which requires, by itself, one IP address.  The 
subscriber is then generally provided with up to 5 usable IP addresses.  This is a fairly static 
value, providing for connectivity to one or two PCs, a gaming system, and perhaps an Internet 
capable TV.  Once assigned and configured for use through the provider, the number of IP 
addresses cannot be exceeded and the lease duration of these IP addresses is fairly stagnant.  
The wireless realm operates a bit differently.   
As is true of wired ISPs, IP address scopes vary by provider.  In a 4G world each mobile device is 
provided an IP address from its carrier, but that mobile space is shared from one provider to 
the other.  This shared mobile space allows a user to drive from one end of the country to 
another and maintain reasonably stable connectivity as they transition from one provider to the 
other, from one cell tower to the next.  As the mobile user transitions from one carrier network 
to another, their IP address moves along with them.   
The most notable relevance of this migration to 4G networks is that this technology enables the 
convergence of the wired networks to wireless.  IP-based applications and services that had 
been, for the most part, isolated to the wired network are now fully functional in the realm of 
the mobile device.  The adaptation of this new generation of technology only heightens the 
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depletion of IPv4 address ranges and hastens the requirement for full migration to IPv6.  New 
specifications of 4G devices require IPv6 addressing28.  
An IPAR system offers significant improvements to wireless providers.  Data requirements for 
this subset of providers can be more involved than for traditional wired providers.  For a typical 
ISP, personally identifiable information for a subscriber consists of the IP address in use and the 
physical address on file for that subscriber.  Though that is also true of the wireless subscriber...  
this IP address is assigned to this customer at this address... the subscriber is mobile thus their 
actual location will vary.  For the purposes of successful law enforcement, the identifiable 
information for the physical location where the activity originated can be difficult to obtain.   If 
an internet crime takes place for a wired customer, it is fairly easy for law enforcement to 
obtain the location of the activity from the provider.  When that internet crime takes place on 
an IP enabled mobile device, the positioning location of the device can be an important 
component of law enforcement’s investigation.  As outlined in an interview with Sergeant 
Glenn Lang of the Maine State Computer Crimes Unit, “..in our typical child pornography case 
the location is secondary by far to the name of the subscriber.  In most of these cases the 
location is not very important because they generally need or want privacy to upload or 
download contraband.  That is almost always home.  If it’s a harassment or missing person case 
the location is the vital part of the investigation.  Wireless devices in general have created a lot 
of problems for us...”29 
                                                 
28 Wikipedia.com. “IPv4 address exhaustion.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4_address_exhaustion (accessed 
December 27, 2010).   
 
29 Lang, Glen.  Phone interview. Sergeant Glen Lang, Maine State Computer Crimes Unit. (6 Oct. 2010). 
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Sergeant Lang outlines an important separation in information needed between the wired and 
wireless worlds.  As such, an IPAR would either have to account for both scenarios, as both will 
be submitting data to the repository, or provide alternative methods separating the two types 
of providers.  As previously indicated, for traditional wired ISPs location information will consist 
of the address on file for the subscriber.  For wireless providers, the location information would 
include similar data relative to the physical address of the subscriber, however, location 
information relative to the mobile positioning of the cellular device when the IP address was 
assigned would have to be either appended as part of the data stream or omitted and provided 
in a separate request.   
To determine the best approach for this discrepancy in location information, let’s go back to the 
original concept of the IPAR.  The IPAR is based on a similar model to a freeway, toll charges, 
and vehicle license plate information.  These represent the Internet (freeway), the service 
provider (toll charges) and the web-enabled user (license plate).  Highway users are mobile in 
the same way wireless customers are mobile.  The highway authority is not concerned with the 
location of the cars on the highway, only that they have paid the toll fees to use it.  Law 
enforcement is the entity concerned with location of the vehicles, but like the toll taker, they 
are not concerned with the location of every vehicle on the highway as this is far too much data 
for them to digest.  Instead they are concerned with the location of the vehicle only when an 
incident occurs.   This lends to a sound conceptual approach to the IPAR.  Location of the 
subscriber, or in this model the address of the vehicle’s registration, is a mandatory inclusion in 
the data stream from the provider to the IPAR.  Various mobile locations of the subscriber are 
too changing and would overburden the IPAR when the mobile location is really only important 
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when an incident occurs.  As a method to avoid collecting millions of unnecessary records for 
wireless providers, the positioning location information for the mobile user would not need to 
be fed real time to the IPAR.   This information would continue to fall under the standard 
subpoena process and be requested only when needed, only when an incident or event 
warrants this information relative to investigation.  This method enables a uniform format for 
the data feed to the IPAR regardless of provider.  Law enforcement would still have real-time 
access to the owner/user of an IP address and could subpoena additional information from the 
provider when needed.   
This continued migration to 4G by the wireless carriers offers these carriers added benefits 
from the existence of an IPAR.  As outlined above, the transition from 3G to 4G technology 
represents the continued transition from circuit-switched to packet-switched technology.  This 
is the migration from the traditional telephony carrier model to the IP-enabled internet model.  
Mobile devices are completing their migration from cellular telephony devices to internet 
enabled, application converged devices.  These are no longer phones but instead are small 
portable computers. This is an opportune time for an IPAR implementation.   
Looking back five years ago, Verizon Wireless would have been subpoenaed for phone records.  
The future for Verizon will include being subpoenaed for internet usage records of their mobile 
devices.  Instead of continuing to develop high capacity systems internally to support this 
changing data and meet this new data retention model, they could instead feed subscriber IP 





With the conceptual model of the IPAR defined, the next step in its development is the 
determination of the sizing and ultimate feasibility of the actual operating model.  This outline 
needs to account for the number of transactions, their content, systems sizing and database 
components.  As with any database, there is a threshold between storage and retrieval where 
there is an incremental degradation in functionality when the number of records grows so large 
that indexing and lookups become too delayed for reasonable use.  This balance between 
storage and retrieval has to be accounted for in the design as this is inherently going to be a 
very large database.  There must also be methods to ensure high levels of security given the 
sensitivity of the data and the targeted segment of users that will be allowed access to the data.  
As defined above, there should also be accommodations for the long term migration to a full 
IPv6 environment, meaning the system must be able to support two distinct IP record formats 
for the unforeseeable future.  Finally, every backend data storage system needs an intuitive 
front-end interface that makes retrieval of the data fast and easy and geared toward the users 
who will be using it.   
For the IPAR implementation let’s begin with sizing.  Based on data from June 30th, 2010, the 
Internet Usage and World Population Statistics reported there were 239,232,863 internet users 
in the United States30.  Where the IPAR is intended only for the United States and is not a global 
endeavor, this value of approximately 240 million users would be the basis for preliminary 
                                                 
30 World Internet Usage Statistics News and World Population Stats. “Internet Usage Statistics, The Internet Big 




sizing.  Keeping in line with our motor vehicle registration analogy, there were 255,917,664 
registered vehicles in the United States according to the 2008 Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics.  In comparison, these values are close enough to speculate that if an existing system 
can support our vehicle registration data then one likely could be sized to support IP address 
assignments. The scope for sizing is still within range of reasonability.   
When we begin to look at the changeability of the data the systems begin to diverge.  According 
to R. L. Polk & Co. the average American keeps their vehicle for 63.9 months or 5.3 years.31  
Americans change their vehicles exponentially less often then they change IP addresses.  This 
means the motor vehicle database, which contains a similar number of users, contains data that 
is relatively stagnant when compared to the changeability of IP address data.  Studies from 
2008 indicate that the average PC in the United States uses 5.7 distinct IP addresses per 
month.32  While this 5.7 value represents only 40% of PCs (with the other 60% maintaining 
much more stable IP addressing) these systems that changed their IP address during a month 
did so with great frequency.   The differentiation here is that the sizing for the IPAR has to 
accommodate not only a formidable amount of data but frequently changing data as well.   
In the technical realm of database technology, there is a term know as VLDB or Very Large 
Database.  This terminology helps to define databases that grow well beyond the size of the 
average operating database.  Wikipedia provides the following definition:  “A very large 
                                                 
31 Korzeniewski, Jeremy. Nov 5, 2010.  “Polk: People continuing to keep vehicles longer.” 
http://www.autoblog.com/2010/11/05/polk-people-continuing-to-keep-vehicles-longer/. (accessed December 13, 
2010).  
 
32 Meierhoefer, Cameron.  October 12, 2010. comScore Voices. “comScore September 2010 qSearch Reporting 
Enhancements.” http://blog.comscore.com/meirhoefer.html.  (accessed December 13, 2010).   
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database, or VLDB, is a database that contains an extremely high number of database rows, or 
occupies an extremely large physical file system storage space. The most common definition of 
VLDB is a database that occupies more than 1 terabyte or contains several billion rows...”33  
Given the scope defined for the IPAR thus far, it meets these criteria as a VLDB.  There are a 
variety of hardware and software platforms that can support VLDBs and these include standard 
server applications such as Microsoft SQL Server and Oracle.  These applications primarily 
reside on Windows or Sun based servers supporting a client/server database environment.  
Microsoft SQL specifications outline support for a maximum database size of 524,272 TB of 
data, 32,767 user connections and a maximum number of rows limited only by the storage 
capacity of the hard drives within the server hard drives or storage network.34  This would 
support the preliminary sizing for the IPAR.  For very large scale applications, however, 
mainframe architecture is often the selection of choice and is, not coincidentally, the platform 
in use by the Department of Motor Vehicles today.   Let’s look at why. 
There are several features of the mainframe environment that make it the ideal platform for a 
system like the IPAR.  Reliability is one significant benefit.  This comes grouped into a set of 
native features known as RAS which stands for Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability.35  
While the acronym is now commonplace, it describes one of the most purposed reasons the 
                                                 
33 Wikramanayake, G.N. and J.S. Goonetillake.  “Managing Very Large Databases and Data Warehousing.” 
University of Colombo School of Computing. http://www.cmb.ac.lk/academic/institutes/nilis/reports/gihan.pdf 
(accessed December 22, 2010).   
 
34 Microsoft Corporation©.  2011. “Maximum Capacity Specifications for SQL Server.”   
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms143432(printer).aspx (accessed November 12, 2010).   
 
35 Lie, David and John Maly.  Stanford University. May 27, 2000. EE482: “Advanced Computer Organization 
Processor Architecture.” Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability. 
http://cva.stanford.edu/classes/ee482a/scribed/lect16.pdf  (accessed November 12, 2010).   
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mainframe environment continues its stronghold in the database market.  The system 
architecture offers one of the greatest uptime values in the market.36  This is achieved through 
various techniques of malfunction self-detection and continued operation through system 
hardware or operating system errors.  Considering the always-on nature of the internet and the 
collective use of the IPAR to capture that IP data, the system that houses the IPAR must offer 
the highest uptime and availability possible.    
Another advantage of the mainframe environment is security.  In 1991 an international 
standard for security went into effect know as the Evaluation Assurance Level (or EAL 1 – 7)37.  
This EAL value is assessed on technology applications or systems with a numeric grading 
assigned once a Common Criteria security evaluation is completed.   IBM’s mainframe platform 
received one of the highest levels of security certifications, EAL Level 5.38  While the numerical 
designate is indicative of successful security testing, there are also other factors that provide 
native security advantages to the mainframe platform.  By its very platform the mainframe is 
more secure than traditional environments like Microsoft.  Consider it the hackability quotient.  
There are far fewer programmers that possess the necessary skills to hack a mainframe 
environment than those that can hack a Microsoft environment.  Microsoft’s platform leaves 
many holes through which a hacker can attack, erase, or siphon information and there are 
many more programmers with the skills and tools to impact that environment.  In a January 
                                                 
36 Radding, Alan.  July 22, 2010.  Big Fat Finance Blog.  “Mainframe 101 for C-Level Executives.”  
http://bigfatfinanceblog.com/2010/07/22/mainframe-101-for-c-level-executives/ (accessed November 12, 2010).   
 
37 Wikipedia.  “Evaluation Assurance Level”.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evaluation_Assurance_Level (accessed 
November 12, 2010.   
 
38 IBM®.  “IBM Security.” http://www-03.ibm.com/systems/z/advantages/security/index.html  (accessed 
November 12, 2010).    
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2010 article by Stan King titled “Mainframe Hacking: Fact or Fiction” he assesses mainframe 
security well:   
“If you want proof of this claim, consider what you can find by searching news archives and 
trade journals, looking for references to mainframes and data loss, hacking, security breaches, 
and similar topics. Recent research included checking the archives of ComputerWorld, 
InformationWeek, and The Wall Street Journal for reports of unauthorized access of any 
traditional mainframe environment via userid/password exploitation, corruption of a 
mainframe-based networking resource, or contamination of a mainframe system software 
component. This list may sound decidedly short, but it represents the basic foundation of 
mainframe safety, security, and integrity..... all computers aren’t created equal.”39 
Security is likely the most important aspect of the IPAR implementation.  This is a database 
containing sensitive information that is intended to be restricted to law enforcement and 
governmental agencies. Having a hardened system to support that data is imperative.  This 
would be a similar evaluation that led to the mainframe in place in support of the motor vehicle 
database.   
While security is critical, it is still imperative that the system be physically sized to 
accommodate not only the data it will store but the number of users who will access that data 
and the processing time it takes to index and access that data.   Indexing of data is a critical 
function and one that relies more heavily on system memory than hard drive space.  One 
                                                 
39 King, Stan H.  January 11, 2010.  “Mainframe Hacking: Fact or Fiction?” http://www.mainframezone.com/it-
management/mainframe-hacking-fact-or-fiction  (accessed November 12, 2010).   
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common choke-point in very large databases is that indexing can become so large it fills system 
memory to capacity, reaching a threshold where data ultimately becomes inaccessible.  The 
DMV model not only accounts for massive volumes of data and optimal security, the databases 
themselves are additionally distributed into state and/or regional systems.  The format of the 
DMV model segregates both the registration management as well as the physical systems by 
state which reduces the size of any one database and further reduces responsibility to the 
subset of the drivers residing in the state.  While each database can be queried through links to 
the others, this separation of databases reduces the size of each individual database, improves 
indexing and lookups having less data to sort through and also narrows the scope of data to 
keep it aligned with law enforcement’s jurisdictional areas.  This is an ideal model to emulate 
with the IPAR.   
Again following the DMV’s existing design, the IPAR system would be dissected into individual 
state systems.  Each of these state-level IPARs would support the customers subscribing to 
internet service within each state.  As an example, Time Warner Cable’s New England division 
supports customers in Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts40.  Under this model, Time 
Warner Cable would send IP data on their Maine customers to the Maine IPAR database, while 
sending IP address data on their New Hampshire customers to the New Hampshire IPAR.  The 
records would contain a common ISPID (ISP ID) as the provider is the same for both states, 
however the records would be sent to two different systems based upon the physical location 
of the customer.  This is a common delineation that ISPs use in scoping IP address ranges 
between states or metropolitan areas, keeping the structure of the IPAR in line with current ISP 
                                                 
40 Time Warner Cable, Inc.  Subscriber Statement.  January 1, 2011.   
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and state operations.   Furthermore, this model supports law enforcement entities that are 
typically limited jurisdictionally by state.  This structure provides the most supportive model 
relative to data retrieval as the Maine police officer wouldn’t have to query through millions of 
records from other states to obtain the data from their own.  As is the case with the DMV and 
with law enforcement relative to criminal activity, any criminal actions that cross state lines falls 
under federal jurisdiction.  Federal agencies would have access to all state IPARs.   
The present DMV structure contains 51 separate state or territorial entities.  This would then be 
a configuration baseline for the IPAR with one database per state.  Law enforcement entities 
and state agencies would be granted specific access to their state’s IPAR, with Federal and 








Figure2:  DMV Geographic Agencies 
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With design and scope of the IPAR identified, our last systematic configuration would define the 
format of the data fed to and contained in the IPAR and the querying system that enables its 
access.  Let’s begin with record format. 
 
IPAR Record Format   
Every data string to the IPAR will begin with the ISPID field.  This field represents the ID of the 
ISP that is sending the record and ultimately responsible for the IP assignment to the customer.  
This ISPID number will be contained in Field 1 and is represented by a seven-digit numeric value 
assigned to the ISP when registering with the IPAR.  Seven numeric digits in the ISPID means the 
field can support 107 unique ISP identifiers or 10 million unique values... more than enough to 
accommodate the number of registered ISPs in the United States.41  The first character in this 
ISPID number represents the geographic range of the ISP.  1 in the first position equates to an 
ISP that is wholly contained within and serving a single state entity (ex: Vermont).  A value of 4 
means the ISP serves only a single, unique metropolitan area, such as New York City or Los 
Angeles.  A 7 represents an individual ISP that provides service across more than one state, as 
was the example referenced above for Time Warner Cable’s New England division (Maine, New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts).  All other values for the first character in the ISPID are reserved 
for future designations.  The remaining 6 digits within the ISPID are sequentially assigned at the 
time of registration.   
                                                 
41 Internet World Stats Usage and Population Statistics. “United States of America Internet Usage and Broadband 
Usage Report” http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/us.htm (accessed October 11, 2010).   
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Field 2 in the IPAR data string, the Format Field, is a single-digit numeric value that represents 
the format of the IP address.  A numeric value of 4 represents an IP address that is formatted as 
an IPv4 address.  A numeric value of 6 indicates the IP address format is in the form of an IPv6 
address.  The delineation is important for various reasons.  Foremost, the IPAR must be able to 
support both IPv4 and IPv6 for a period well into the future as both formats will exist 
concurrently for many years.  In addition, the character length and format of the address varies 
significantly from an IPv4 address to an IPv6 address.  This means that the following field, which 
will contain the actual IP address, will be a variable length, with the length of the field 
dependent upon the type of IP address being sent within the string.  A precursor value 
designating the IP version of the address ensures proper interpretation and handling of the 
subsequent value.  This also ensures an easy transition to the eventual all IPv6 environment 
when the Format Field can eventually discarded or dropped.  
Field 3 in the IPAR data string is the IP Address.  This is a variable-length, alphanumeric field 
that will contain the IP address assigned to the customer.   
Field 4 is an alpha field that contains the Last Name of the subscriber.  This will be a fixed-width, 
left adjusted field, with a predefined field length of 30 characters.   
Field 5 is an alpha field that contains the First Name of the subscriber.  Like Field 4, this will be a 
fixed-width, left adjusted field, with a predefined field length of 30 characters.   
Field 6 in the IPAR string is the zip code field and contains the zip code of the service address for 
the subscriber.  This will be a numeric field set to a fixed width of 5 characters.  The zip code 
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provides additional methods for subscriber delineation and can accomplish this in a few ways.  
Of greatest importance, the zip code can provide a primary level of jurisdiction.  In the example 
above, where the single ISP provides service across multiple states, a zip code check point 
ensures data can be segregated out to the appropriate policing authorities.  A zip code for a 
Maine subscriber can be distinguished from that of a New Hampshire subscriber, separating 
those into the proper IPARs and proper jurisdictional entities.  In addition, a zip code further 
distinguishes subscribers who may share a common first and last name, such as Mary Brown.  
For a police investigation, narrowing the field for inquiry is critical.  When there is a trigger for 
criminal activity, it is important that law enforcement is able to narrow their focus down to the 
appropriate geographical area.  In a metropolitan area such as New York City, that has 176 
unique zip codes42, this is a valuable piece of additional information in reducing the scope of an 
investigation.  When used in conjunction with the leading digit in the ISPID address, which 
designates the geographic range of the ISP, law enforcement enjoys better optimization of this 
repository.  
Field 7 is the Date Field and indicates the date that the IP address was assigned to the 
customer.  As a date field, this field is formatted as an all numeric, 8-digit value, with a data 
format of YYYYMMDD, or 20101225.   Keeping in mind the purpose of the IPAR is to provide as 
close to real-time data as possible relative to IP address assignments, this is intended to be a 
very accurate date value relative to the assignment and in an optimal configuration this data is 
sent to the IPAR at the time the assignment is made to the customer.   
                                                 
42  Yahoo Answers.com.  “How many different ZIP codes are there in New York City?”  
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070320141640AAcuLmf  (accessed November 3, 2010).   
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Field 8 is the Time Field and represents the timestamp of the IP address assignment to the 
subscriber.  All time values will be designated on GMT or Greenwich Mean Time standard43.  
9:30PM Eastern Standard Time would be represented as 02:30am GMT.   
Integrating the above fields into a single data string, our format now appears as follows:   
<ISPID>,<FormatField>,<IPAddress>,<LastName>,<FirstName>,<Zip>,<Date>,<Time>  
The received data is interpreted in the table below. 
ISPID Format Field IP Address Last Name First Name Zip Date Time 
7722651 4 192.168.2.10 Ouellette Rita 04101 20101225 09:47:03 
4722633 6 2002:C0A8:20A:0:0:0:0:0 Brown Mary 11040 20101107 22:01:11 
This standard format for data submission to the IPAR means no header record needs to be sent 
prior to the transmission of the data string.  When an IP address is allocated to a subscriber 
from a dynamic pool of IP addresses, this data string, in this format, is forwarded to the IPAR for 
registration within the database.  Over a period of normal operations, this table is updated 
numerous times with the various changes in assignments for each customer.  As the data is 
populated a record of a user’s IP address assignments begins to emerge.  Using the table below 
as a representation of the data fed into the IPAR, law enforcement and other IPAR users will 
have an accurate record of the historical IP addresses assigned to customers and for what 
period each user had the IP address for their use.  
                                                 
43 Timeanddate.com. “GMT – Greenwich Mean Time.”  




ISPID Format Field IP Address Last Name First Name Zip Date Time 
1895577 6 fe80:0:0:0:0:0:a59:4202 Oneida Uda 13042 20100531 23:58:02 
7775633 4 87.63.89.111 Haviezeh Rameira 90210 20100720 10:28:11 
7632478 4 128.7.63.9 Pike Trenton 37201 20100819 17:33:59 
4756352 6 fe80:0:0:0:0:0:ac6:4d59 Kincade Rosaire 30301 20101001 11:31:45 
4722633 6 fe80:0:0:0:0:0:c0a8:20a Brown Mary 11040 20101107 22:01:11 
4722633 6 fe80:0:0:0:0:0:c0a8:216 Brown Mary 11040 20101130 18:15:07 
1777755 4 198.225.112.87 Lambert Ralph 83728 20101113 13:45:19 
1895467 4 30.250.17.95 Oda Kathy 60601 20101118 12:02:02 
1257963 4 21.225.78.53 Sanchez Have 27609 20101125 19:05:05 
1124590 4 45.6.211.9 Neal Beverly 99501 20101201 6:12:54 
7983219 4 10.198.22.56 Slate Philip 06155 20101218 1:17:45 
1257965 4 172.22.96.89 Gordone Helen 28202 20101219 2:02:09 
7722651 4 192.168.2.10 Ouellette Rita 04101 20101225 9:47:03 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Figure 3:  IPAR Data 
 
Query and Selection Application 
In order for the IPAR tool to be truly usable in its intended manner, sorting and selection 
criteria will have to be developed into an easy-to-use query application.  The IPAR application, 
or IPAP, will offer the following usability features:  
• Three-factor authentication login window ensuring secure access to IPAR data.  
• Data look-up functionality allowing for selection by Name (Last Name, then First), and IP 
Address 




Two-factor authentication is the most common industry standard for authenticating users as 
they attempt to access secure data.44  Any method that requires dual entry to obtain access can 
be deemed two-factor authentication; however, the truest forms incorporate the use of tokens 
or fobs for the most secure levels of access.  For the IPAR Application (IPAP), three-factor 
authentication is defined and represented in the following login screen:  
 
 
Figure 4:  IPAR Login Screen 
 
Remember that law enforcement must register with the IPAR in order to obtain access to the 
data.  Only validated law enforcement and governmental agencies will be granted access to use 
the system.  Upon successful registration, users are provided with a Login ID and a system 
generated, sequentially-assigned numeric Registration Number.  Once prompted to create the 
initial password for the account, these three pieces of information must be entered in order to 
gain access to the IPAR.     
 
                                                 
44 Bradley, Tony.  About.com. “What is Two-Factor Authentication?”  Understanding what two-factor 
authentication is and how it works.  http://netsecurity.about.com/od/quicktips/qt/twofactor.htm  (accessed 
November 14, 2010).   
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Data lookup functionality is then presented to the user.  Users are offered the ability to sort by 
both Name and IP Address.  The following image provides an example of the Name Query 
screen and the data presented:   
 
 
   Figure 5:  IPAR Name Query Screen 
 
Queried data is sorted by the name queried, in alphabetical order by Last Name then First 
Name.  Names that are an exact match to the selection criteria are highlighted for easy 
recognition, with the remaining fields presented for further ability to narrow the selection to an 
individual record.  Additional sorting presents each record in order by Zip Code, Date and Time.  
In this example, the first six records provide an outline of one customer and their IP Address 




Similar processes are in use in selections by IP Address.  The IP Address Query screen is shown 
below: 
 
Figure 6: IPAR Address Query Screen 
 
 
Selected data is presented in order by IP Address.  Records matching the queried IP are 
highlighted for quick recognition.  Data is then further sorted by the Date and Time of the 
assignment of the IP Address, providing a historical record of the assignment of this specific 
address.  ISPID values remain the same on each record as this IP address block belongs to a 
specific service provider.   
 
Within each query screen are the options to Print or Save the data results.  This ability to make 
a permanent record of the queried data is critical in criminal investigations.  Evidence must be 
available in a format that is admissible as evidence.  Without proper accompanying data, 
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‘screen shots’ of data from a terminal are not viewed with the same quality rating as report 
data that has date and timestamp values within the report structure.  Providing proper header 
information containing the IPAR designation along with the data and time of the report and 
subsequent data provides a highly credible record of the IP Address data for submission in legal 
proceedings.   
Sample report data is shown here: 
 
 
Figure 7:  IPAR Address Report  
 
 
From the outline of the data represented here, it is critical that the data be sent from the ISP in 
the correct format and order.  For the larger ISPs, this extract can be programmed as an 
automated forwarding of data from the same systems that provide the IP address to the 
subscriber or from the tools that house this information for customer support troubleshooting.  
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For the smaller ISPs however, with less sophisticated systems, automation of this data 
submission may not be possible.  As such, there must be a manual submission process available 
for providers to manually enter data into the IPAR.  This manual entry would have to contain 
the same information and follow the same data string as shown above.  Here is how the manual 
entry process would work. 
 
Regardless of the size of the provider each registrant is presented with an IPAR login screen as 
shown here.  This is the same login entry point that was shown previously, as the same portal is 
used whether retrieving or submitting data.     
 
 
Figure 8:  IPAR Registrant Login Screen 
 
 
Based upon the registration number entered in the login screen, the user is either presented 
with tools to query data or the forms necessary to enter data.  For the service provider who is 





Figure 9:  IPAR Manual Data Entry Screen 
 
Here the provider is presented with all the necessary input fields to complete a manual IPAR 
record.  Each field is formatted to ensure data is entered in the proper format for the database 
structure.  Selecting either IP version 4 or 6 enables not only population of the single digit value 
within the Format Field; it also enables formatting within the corresponding IP Address input 
field.  Formatting within the Date Input Field ensures data follows the YYYY / MM / DD format 
and Time can be entered directly in GMT format or converted using the GMT conversion 
button.  Once the input record is completed, pressing the Submit button enters the data into to 




Figure 10:  IPAR Error Messaging Example 
 
 
Error messaging within the form structure ensures all data is entered and messages displayed 
when there are errors or omissions.   
 
While enabling manual entry into the IPAR ensures even the smallest of providers can comply 
with reporting requirements, it is not a feasible or reasonable method for data entry for mid-
size or large providers whose IP data is changing constantly.  The ideal solution for accurate 





Having defined the application, it is important to next define the agencies that will be allowed 
access to the IPAR.  Privacy and security are of primary importance so a definition of who will 
be allowed access to retrieve information from the IPAR is critical to ensuring its acceptance as 
66 
 
a legitimate tool.  Similar to the Department of Motor Vehicle, the IPAR is intended for use by 
law enforcement and government agencies.  Governmental agencies that have access to 
interception and wiretap data include45:  
• US Government Agencies, such as the United States Government itself, or any court, 
department or subdivision of the United States Government.  The US Department of 
Homeland Security is also included here.  
• State Agencies.  These include any state government itself, such as the State of New 
York, and any court, department, or subdivision of that state.  Many states also define 
School Districts and School Administrative Units as state agencies.46  
• Public law enforcement agencies.  This group includes: 
o State and Federal Attorneys General 
o State and Federal Bureaus of Investigation 
o State Troopers and Highway Patrol agencies 
o State and Federal Departments of Public Safety 
o State and Federal Bureau of Securities and Investigative Services 
o State local and municipal law enforcement departments 
• Special districts.  These can sometimes includes county service areas, such as taxing or 
zoning agencies, but only ones that qualify by providing proof that they are indeed 
                                                 
45  California Department of Motor Vehicles.  “Government Requester Accounts.” 
http://www.dmv.ca.gov/otherser/gra/govreq.htm (accessed December 19, 2010).   
 
46 States and Education – State Administrative Services in Education. 
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/2449/States-Education-STATE-ADMINISTRATIVE-SERVICES-IN-
EDUCATION.html (accessed December 28, 2010).    
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classified as governmental agencies.  Special districts are further defined as performing 
proprietary functions for the state or federal government within certain limited 
boundaries47, such as “New England”.   
Each of these agencies, defined as ‘Government Requesters’, would be provided access to the 
IPAR.  Many of these Federal agencies are already awarded access to surveillance data under 
the intercept requirements.  All of these entities are granted access to criminal and public data 
such as motor vehicle and licensing records.  Expanding access to the IPAR for these groups is 
well within scope of their responsibilities.   
 
Who would not be granted access to the IPAR?  Groups that are currently not defined as 
Governmental agencies include: 
• Non-Profits Agencies regardless of whether they are fully or partially funded by another 
governmental agency.  
• Private Police Departments.  This includes any fire or police department that is fully 
owned and operated by a private company.  These are not considered public service 
providers and are therefore not granted access to governmental databases.   
• Sovereign or foreign nations.  This includes tribal nations within the United States or 
foreign nations outside the United States such as Canada and Mexico.  While it is 
common for Federal Agencies to share information with Canadian and Mexican 
authorities, in particular in criminal investigations that cross national borders, these 
                                                 
47 University of Kansas.  Center for Teaching Excellence. “Special Districts.” 
www.cte.ku.edu/.../Presentation%20Example%204%20Special%20Districts.ppt (accessed December 28, 2010).  
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foreign authorities are not awarded direct access to information on American citizens.  
As such, these entities would also not be granted access to the IPAR.  
Requesting access to the IPAR requires a registration process for access.  While online 
applications are commonplace, most state agencies require completion of written forms in 
order to obtain access to databases such as motor vehicle registrations.  One example from the 
State of California requires the completion of a four-page application in addition to signed 
agreement to a two-page Information Security Statement.48  Other states define requirements 
for annual renewal and annual recertification.  Areas that remain consistent in the application 
process include: 
• Definition of the agency requesting access 
• Classification of the application as New, Change, or Renewal of access 
• Jurisdiction of the agency as State, Federal, or Other forms of agency 
• Format of data access such as online, paper/hardcopy, tape, or secure transfer such as 
FTP 
• Security guidelines outlining definitions of appropriate of use, security provisions, and 
processes for security or data breach.  
These guidelines provide a sufficiently secure method of providing law enforcement and 
governmental agencies access to the IPAR.  The data contained within the IPAR and the security 
considerations relative to that data fall well in line with defined guidelines for other secure 
                                                 
48   State of California Department of Motor Vehicle. “Information Security Statement.”  
ttp://www.dmv.ca.gov/forms/inf/inf1128.pdf  (accessed December 28, 2010).  
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state and federal databases as defined above.  As such, the registration process for the IPAR 
would follow suit.  An example Requester Account Application is shown here: 
 
 
Figure 11:  IPAR Requester Account Application 
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In the format displayed above, this application contains the same sections as are defined in 
accessing secure data from the motor vehicle database, including specifics for maintaining 
proper safety once access is granted.  When the application process is completed and access is 
approved, the requester is returned an approval authorization along with their registration 
number and temporary credentials to use.  An example authorization form is displayed here: 
 
Figure 12:  IPAR Authorization Form 
 
The descriptions above outline the process for gaining inquiry access to the IPAR database.   
Service providers must also complete an authorization process in order to submit data to the 
repository.  The application and authorizations for submitters vary from those requesting 
inquiry.  An example is shown on the following pages and includes fields for serving area, IP 










Figure 14:  IPAR Provider Submission Account Registration Application Page 2 
Once the application is received and approved, the service provider is returned an 
authorization response very similar to that of a requester.  The form below is an example of a 





Figure 14:  IPAR Service Provider Submission Access Authorization Form 
This application and approval process follows similar guidelines and processes in use with the 
Department of Motor Vehicles.  While much of the process has migrated to online access and 
electronic entry, a great deal of the application and authorization processes remain paper 
based.  In contacting the local state agency to determine why much of the application process is 
still document-based, the following reasoning was provided49:  
- Certain systems did not support automation for these processes 
- Age of the system and / or application didn’t support online entry or access (no front-
end application entry point exists) 
- State funding at this time did not support the capital needed to fully automate the 
application and authorization process 
                                                 
49 Curtis, Kathleen.  Phone interview. Kathleen Curtis, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, State of Maine. (Oct. 7, 2010). 
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- Preference within certain legal and state departments were for a handwritten signature 
to be present on the application documentation, where automation of access did not 
allow for handwritten signatures 
- Belief that the physical copy and written application process provided greater security 
control than allowing open online access (no ability to confirm the validity of the user 
requesting access) 
There is legitimacy to the points referenced above in that many state systems are aged and may 
not support many of the upgrades needed for online access.  State governments are also short 
on funding and would find it financially difficult to retro fit applications to support fully 
automated registration and authorization.  How, then, do we fund the creation of the IPAR? 
 
Who pays? 
Regardless of which entity manages the data, it is ultimately the consumer who has to pay for 
it.  The growing costs of data archiving and management for an ISP, in the millions of dollars per 
year, is eventually transferred on to the subscriber as part of the ISP’s cost of doing business.  
The IPAR solution decreases the archiving aspect for an ISP, which reduces both onsite disk and 
offsite storage costs, however the systems that regulate usage and allocation of IP addressing 
for subscribers would continue to be managed by the provider.  This means only a portion of 
the costs of IP address management are shifted away from the ISP.   
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On the receiving end, State and Federal agencies would now bear the costs of storage and 
archiving of the IPAR.  While this adds to the initial cost of storage hardware and offsite record 
retention, there are several significant cost and operational improvements that offset the 
expense.   
• Reimbursement for subpoena processing costs.  There can be significant costs involved 
in the request, processing, and serving of an official subpoena requesting IP 
information.  An IPAR solution removes at least one subpoena, in a two-step subpoena 
process, the one to the ISP to determine the user of an IP address.  ISPs are granted the 
ability to charge for their services in response to subpoena requests for information.  
An example of cost reimbursement fees for Cox Communication is included in 
Addendum A.  Fees can include costs for basic information, expedited handling, 
additional per-IP fee, copying fees, excessive account lookup fees, data media fees, and 
incorrect ISP fees50.  Costs charged to the law enforcement agencies ultimately become 
a cost of the state or governmental agency they are funded through.   
• Costs for law enforcement. When law enforcement identifies an activity that warrants 
investigation, they must first make a request to the District Attorney’s office for a 
subpoena to be issued.  A typical DA’s office holds a backlog of subpoena requests, so 
there is a usual delay in the initial turnaround time for the request to be processed.  
Once the subpoena is submitted to the ISP, there is a normal response window of 
                                                 
50 Cox Communication, Inc. “Cox Communication LEA Information Policy”, last modified October 1, 2009. Notice to 




anywhere from 10 days to up to 30 days to provide the response.  If this is part one of a 
two-step subpoena, then the process repeats when the first response is returned.  In 
these scenarios, it is not unusual for a request by law enforcement for IP information to 
take two months and longer.  The delays mean increased cost for law enforcement as 
investigations take longer and criminal activity continues without impedance.  This also 
means increased costs for states that fund the expenses of the state’s District 
Attorney’s offices.   With IP address information stored in an IPAR, there is a direct 
reduction in state costs both at the district attorney and law enforcement levels.   
• Witness costs.  Depending on the jurisdiction, State and/or Federal governments cover 
the cost of ISP witnesses that are subpoenaed to testify in criminal cases.  Costs can 
include the cost of travel, time, records submission and others.  In a criminal case, the 
government covers all costs of the prosecution. With direct access to data from the 
IPAR, these ISP witness expenses are reduced or removed.   
• Small providers.  Certain small ISPs have been unable to comply with current data 
retention policies.  They have not had either the infrastructure or the financial ability to 
record and store subscriber IP assignments.  Building such an infrastructure is cost 
prohibitive based on their smaller revenue streams, leaving them sandwiched between 
the costs to comply and the penalties of noncompliance.  An IPAR alternative would 
allow these small suppliers to provide subscriber information, whether manually or 
automated, to the IPAR and reduce the expense burden of compliance. This would also 
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provide subscriber information for a subset of customers where once this information 
was unobtainable.   
• Taxation loses from copyright infringement.   In a study conducted by The Institute for 
Policy Innovation, titled "The True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the U.S. 
Economy," the report found that copyright infringement "costs the U.S. economy $58.0 
billion in total output, costs American workers 373,375 jobs and $16.3 billion in 
earnings, and costs federal, state, and local governments $2.6 billion in tax revenue."51    
The key components for reducing piracy comes in improved policing and more rapid 
identification of offenders.  An IPAR solution allows law enforcement more streamlined 
and more real-time access to user identification, greatly improving the chances of 
catching perpetrators.  At a minimum, a 1% improvement in identification equates to 
$2.6 million in increased tax revenues.  With accessibility to up-to-date IP address 
information, an IPAR solution is likely to provide substantial improvements to tax 
revenues far in excess of 1% thus far in excess of $2.6 million.   
Considering the costs outlined above, the IPAR is more than a simple transference of process 
and fees from one entity to another.  There are true costs savings to be realized in a more 
streamlined, centralized repository.  While these are a few of the cost reductions, there are also 
certain fees and taxes that offset the costs of an IPAR.  Telecommunications companies are 
required to assess State and local taxes for the services they provide to their customers.  Those 
                                                 
51 Photo Attorney®. “The Cost of Copyright Infringement.” http://www.photoattorney.com/2007/10/costs-of-




taxes would continue to be assessed and paid to the state.  Service providers must also assess 
and collect Universal Service Fees, as well as FCC fees and 911 fees.52  These fees have been 
developed over time to assist with cost allocation for services such as emergency fire and 
rescue, as well as costs of delivering services to rural areas.  If ISPs were assessed a .5% fee for 
each internet subscriber, and an average consumer brings $45/month in revenues per internet 
account, the IPAR fee would amount to a 22.5 cent per month cost per subscriber.  While this 
would help with the reallocation of the data archiving costs for state and federal agencies, the 
corresponding reduction in staffing and data management for the ISP would far outweigh the 
monthly IPAR fee.   
ISPs can also be charged for ISPID registration.  As outlined above, the registration process for 
the IPAR provides the ISPID tag to be associated with each incoming IP address record.  In 
addition, the ISP is given a specific and secure IP address to be used as a secure tunnel through 
the firewalls to transmit update records to the database.  Costs for registration would be 
minimized to encourage even the smaller providers to participate, however even the smaller 
fee would help offset the costs involved in the creation and securing of the dedicated IP tunnel 
per ISP.   
As outlined previously, third party providers could also provide a method of offsetting some of 
the IPAR costs.  Third parties offer a variety of legal and integration services such as completion 
of court-ordered records, data communication interception services, and data retention and 
archiving services.  In addition to providing these critical services to ISPs, these same services 
                                                 
52 Federal Communications Commission. “Understanding your Telephone Bill.”  FCC Consumer Facts. 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/understanding.html (accessed October 30, 2010).  
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could be used by state and federal agencies as a method to reduce systems development and 
corresponding support staff.  These are companies that have already met the stringent 
guidelines for governmental approval relative to security, privacy, and confidentiality thus many 
of the systems could be provided by outsourced entities at less cost.  
Finally, referencing back to the Department of Motor Vehicle model, other charges could also 
apply for accessing data in the IPAR.   One example in use with the DMV is the fee assessed to 
obtain a copy of one’s own records.53   It is common for individuals to want to obtain their own 
motor vehicle records whether it is for an open legal case or for purposes of verifying the data 
contained within the records.  This would also be a reasonable request of internet subscribers 
or for legal teams representing these subscribers.  Where the data applies to the specific 
customer, the question of privacy does not factor in and the records can be provided (upon 
confirmation of the subscriber’s information) with a small fee assessed to offset the cost of 
producing the records.  Other fees apply if records are requested via tape, FTP, online or other 
electronic methods.  While individually each of these fees is small, collectively these revenues 
can provide a reasonable offset to some of the systems and storage costs that will come along 
with an IPAR deployment.   
                                                 
53 Department of Driver Services. “How do I request a driver history report (MVR)?” December 13, 2010. 
http://www.dds.ga.gov/drivers/DLdata.aspx?con=1740840381&ty=dl (accessed December 28, 2010).  
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Future Development and Expansion 
The future for IPAR lies in the opportunities this type of database would offer in integration 
with other databases and other services.  While protecting the privacy of IP address information 
is key, providing consolidated data to those agencies that already have access to the private 
information is an intriguing future for the IPAR.  Use of the internet has become the norm.  
With more and more applications becoming web-enabled or internet served, the use of IP 
addressing will also become the norm across many more devices and services.  Is it possible 
that vehicles could be assigned IP addresses for their built in navigation and emergency 
systems?  The answer is yes.  That reality is not in the future but one that exists now, in vehicles 
like the Chevy Volt.  According to GM, “Each Volt also has its own IP address...” based on a 
partnership with IBM and GM and integrating 10 million lines of software code into the new 
car.54  Could this imply a future where the DMV and the IPAR are integrated into one database 
where each vehicle’s registration also includes their IP address?   
Other integration options also exist.  With a fully functioning IPAR, integrating IP address data 
to a criminal background database becomes possible.  Marrying these two systems could 
provide enormous benefits to law enforcement in tracking criminal behavior beyond physical 
activity to combine it with real-time and historical online activity.  This becomes more 
compelling if the vehicle registration database evolves to include in-car IP addresses as 
referenced above, and now all of these separate entities are combined into one consolidated 
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and complete system.  Motor vehicle records and vehicular offenses could be included and 
linked by the IP addresses assigned to each new vehicle.   Similar to the ability to track 
suspended or revoked licenses, could this integrated data be used to track suspended or 
revoked user IP addresses?   
Some of this integration exists today.  A user’s online criminal activity, such as child 
pornography, becomes part of their criminal record.  Could the reverse be true and a person’s 
physical criminal activity be used to identify, and perhaps also prohibit, online activity?  This is a 
much more compelling and more easily achievable concept if systems such as these are 
integrated.    
Continuing on with the concept of integration, let’s consider other state and federal systems 
that are utilized for employment background checks.  This information is important to potential 
employers to determine validity of criminal information on an application as well as to confirm 
driving eligibility in the event the perspective employee would have access to company 
vehicles.  Could a system like the IPAR eventually be integrated into a background check report?  
If so, then the combined systems could provide information on a user’s IP history and 
potentially any suspension or revocation of online access.  This could be important information 
to a business that needs to ensure information is safeguarded and online behavior is 
appropriate with business practices.  This also leads to interesting concerns relative to user 
confidentiality and privacy, and the separation of personal and workplace internet usage 




This thesis analyzes the process of IP assignment and internet policing and outlines that a 
national IP address database will allow law enforcement and governmental agencies 
improvements in real-time, secure access to subscriber identifying information without 
compromising the security and privacy of internet users.  The present process for IP Address 
allocation, retention, and protection is no longer sufficient to support retention periods, 
archiving costs, and privacy protection.  The improvements outlined in the implementation of a 
centralized IP address database support recording and archiving of IP Address information, in a 
method that is more cost effective, more efficient, and more secure than the current model.  
Furthermore, establishing a foundation for this system that is based on existing systems and 
existing processes encourages support for this new concept and reduces concerns from the 
perspective of user privacy and safety.  American citizens think nothing of affixing a license 
plate to their vehicles to allow them use of the nation’s highways.  This is a simple analogy to 
enable a similar treatment for an IP address, in a manner that citizens understand and have an 
established confidence that their information is protected for use only by the enforcement 
agencies that need it.   Thirty years after the true inception of IP version 4, it is no longer 
feasible or reasonable to continue following legislative and operational guidelines that were 
established long before the Internet was a household or handheld service.  The centralized IP 
address database provides an improved and secure method to better support the new all-IP 
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